HONG KONG (AP) — Pro-democracy activist Jimmy Lai once hoped U.S. President Donald Trump could help stop the imposition of a controversial national security law. The law not only took effect but was also used to sentence him to 20 years in prison.

Ahead of an anticipated trip by Trump to Beijing to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping next week, Lai’s son said his family is now hoping that Trump can help secure his father’s release.

Lai, a prominent critic of Beijing, founded a pro-democracy newspaper that was shut down during a crackdown following the city’s massive anti-government protests in 2019.

Observers say the former media mogul’s plight symbolizes a decline in freedoms Beijing promised when the former British colony returned to Chinese rule in 1997. In an interview with The Associated Press, Sebastien Lai said he fears the clock is ticking for his 78-year-old father.

Trump is expected to discuss trade, the Iran war and Taiwan with Xi. But he said he is also planning to bring up Lai, telling conservative radio host Hugh Hewitt, “there’s a little bitterness, I would say, with him and Jimmy Lai.”

The younger Lai, 31, said his family is hopeful that Trump could help his father, adding that it’s easier to resolve than many of the other complex geopolitical issues the leaders will discuss.

He fears his father will die in prison, which would devastate the family and make him a martyr, he said.

“It’s a lose-lose scenario for every single person,” he said.

Trump has expressed sympathy for Jimmy Lai.

“I feel so badly,” he told reporters in December after Lai was found guilty of conspiracy to collude with foreign forces and conspiring with others to publish seditious articles. He had raised Lai’s case during his October meeting with Xi.

Mark Clifford, president of the Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong Foundation, which advocates for Lai’s release, said people briefed on the October meeting told him that Xi and his staff “noted” Trump’s remarks without pushing back aggressively. Clifford said that suggested they’re willing to talk.

Clifford added that Trump had instructed U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent to raise Lai’s release in last June’s trade talks with China, according to his source. Bessent again mentioned Trump’s desire to free Lai in a recent meeting with Chinese representatives, who acknowledged it without much comment, Clifford said, citing someone with direct knowledge.

“It is positive that senior Chinese officials have stopped pushing back on the issue,” he said. The Treasury Department did not respond to a request for comment.

In public, though, Beijing has remained tough on Lai. In March, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun called him the mastermind behind the riots that shook the city in 2019.

On Thursday, the spokesperson’s office of the ministry didn’t directly answer a question about whether China would consider releasing Lai, saying that Hong Kong issues are internal affairs and foreign interference is not allowed.

The Hong Kong government earlier said Lai’s case had nothing to do with press freedom. In a reply to the AP, it said Lai was convicted after an open and fair trial, and the government will ensure laws are observed and strictly enforced.

The White House did not respond to questions about how vigorously Trump would press for Lai’s release.

Over 100 U.S. lawmakers in a bipartisan group sent a letter to the White House Thursday urging Trump to seek Lai’s release at the upcoming summit with Xi.

Even as U.S.-China tensions have risen, diplomacy has managed to win the release of some prisoners. In 2024, U.S. pastor David Lin was freed after nearly 20 years in Chinese prison, and Washington and Beijing traded several other prisoners under a diplomatic agreement the same year.

But activists say Beijing is becoming less willing to release prisoners who have confronted it over human rights. The Chinese Nobel laureate Liu Xiaobo died at a hospital in northeast China in 2017 after foreign governments urged China to release him for cancer treatment abroad.

Human rights lawyer Jared Genser, who previously represented Liu, said a White House official told him that Trump had called Xi and urged Liu’s medical release.

Under Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, China was more focused on economic integration and more sensitive to its international reputation, said Genser, who helped win another activist’s freedom in 2007. Xi’s China emphasizes sovereignty and resisting foreign interference, he said.

“China knows that by taking a very tough and unrelenting position that most countries in the world are not going to be willing to do more than privately raise a case,” he said. “That self-censorship to me is the biggest factor … in our inability to secure the release of political prisoners under Xi Jinping, as compared to Hu Jintao.”

John Kamm, founder of the Dui Hua Foundation, which advocates for political prisoners, said China previously made concessions when it wanted something, like hosting the Olympics.

But he said U.S. inattention also made it harder to win the release of jailed activists.

“I don’t know of anyone in this administration,” he said, “who cares about political prisoners in China.” An exception might be Secretary of State Marco Rubio, he said, but Rubio’s focus is on other issues.

Kamm said Trump is prioritizing trade, investment and the Iran war. But he said China could agree to release Lai if the U.S. makes concessions on Beijing’s other priorities.

But Thomas Kellogg, executive director of Georgetown Center for Asian Law, said both Beijing and Washington have incentives to make a deal.

Releasing Lai would allow China to signal that it’s ready to move on after almost six years since Beijing imposed the security law in Hong Kong, while Trump’s administration could use a diplomatic win after “a difficult couple of months,” he said.

Kellogg said winning Lai’s release would help the administration earn praise even from its critics.

“If the Trump administration is pushing very hard for Jimmy Lai’s release, then we could get a positive outcome,” he said.

But Wilson Chan, co-founder of the think tank Pagoda Institute, believes the chance for a diplomatic solution is slim as Beijing has a message to send through Lai’s case.

Chan said if the international community keeps raising Lai’s case, Beijing may see him as an influential figure who still poses national security threats. But if they don’t, then Beijing won’t face pressure to act.

Lai, a British citizen, has decided not to appeal his conviction and sentence. The government, which insists Lai is Chinese, is seeking to confiscate his assets on national security grounds.

Sebastien Lai called the move another example of his father “still being attacked.”

The older Lai suffered from health issues including heart palpitations and diabetes, his Hong Kong legal team said in January. The prosecution said a medical report noted his general health condition remained stable. The government insists he was placed in solitary confinement at his own request.

The younger Lai, based in London, has maintained contact with his father through letters during the latter’s over five years in custody. He believes his father will want to live a quiet life if released early.

“My father will die in prison if he’s not freed,” he said. “The Chinese government would be complicit in killing him.”

HONG KONG (AP) — China’s exports rose 14.1% in April from a year earlier, the government said Saturday, despite the Iran war and lingering impacts from higher U.S. tariffs.

The data were released just days ahead of a planned meeting next week between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Beijing.

That beat analysts’ estimates and was a significant improvement from March’s 2.5% year-on-year expansion.

Imports climbed 25.3%, slower than the 27.8% growth in March but still robust.

The Trump-Xi summit comes at a time when relations are beset by multiple issues, with efforts to end the war in Iran eclipsing the usual sources of friction.

“We’re expecting that overall external demand will remain a solid driver of growth this year,” said Lynn Song, chief economist for Greater China at Dutch bank ING, likely led by China’s exports of semiconductors and autos.

In March, Chinese leaders set an annual economic growth target of 4.5% to 5%, slightly lower than last year’s 5% expansion and the lowest target since 1991. Export growth is expected to continue to power its wider economy, especially as shipments increased from China to Europe, Southeast Asia, Latin America and Africa over the past months.

Apart from efforts to broker a peace agreement to end the Iran war, trade and export controls, including rare earths and U.S. tech restrictions on China, will likely be on the agenda during the Trump-Xi summit, following a yearlong U.S.-China trade truce reached late last year when the two leaders last met in South Korea.

Major breakthroughs on export controls are unlikely, but the leaders’ upcoming meeting may bring “incremental” steps to troubleshoot trade friction, HSBC economists said in a recent research note.

“On balance, China looks to have more leverage,” wrote Leah Fahy, senior China economist of Capital Economics, in a note. “But higher tariffs haven’t stopped China’s exports from continuing to surge over the past year, and Beijing has showed that it is prepared to wait out U.S. pressure.”

For China, oil and fuel price hikes caused by the war in Iran are also feeding higher manufacturing and logistics costs across its many factories, said Wei Li, head of multi-asset investments at BNP Paribas Securities (China), while higher global inflation could dampen consumer purchasing power in China’s overseas markets.

Still, China’s overall economy has remained resilient compared with other countries, owing to its large oil reserves and more diversified energy sources.

Nairobi, KENYA (AP) — Use of electric vehicles in Africa is surging, led by Ethiopia, as soaring prices and fuel shortages compel countries to opt for cleaner and cheaper transport.

Africa imported 44,358 electric vehicles from China in 2025, according to data from China’s Commerce Ministry, up from 19,386 in 2024. The shipments, valued at over $200 million, highlight growing demand, especially in Ethiopia after it banned new imports of gas and diesel-powered vehicles in 2024.

More than 115,000 EVs are now on Ethiopia’s roads, accounting for about 8% of the national fleet. In 2025, it imported a third of Africa’s imports from China, ahead of other major markets in South Africa, Egypt, Morocco and Nigeria.

As the Iran war drags on, Ethiopia’s fuel shortages are rippling through transport systems and daily life, reinforcing its effort to cut costly imports of oil and gas and strengthen its energy security. However that trend is raising questions about charging infrastructure and affordability.

Ethiopia’s spends about $4.2 billion on fuel imports annually, straining its foreign currency reserves.

Its minister of Trade and Regional Integration, Kassahun Gofe, said in a statement that the country also is spending up to $128 million monthly on fuel subsidies, while shipments fell short by more than 180,000 metric tons as the imports are disrupted by Iran’s effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the shipping route for about a fifth of oil from the Gulf region before the war.

The government has redoubled its campaign for quicker EV adoption, framing it as a critical buffer against external supply shocks.

“From a general perspective, it is sustainable,” said Hiten Parmar, executive director of South African- based The Electric Mission. “By replacing imported fuel with domestically generated electricity, Ethiopia is strengthening its energy security position.”

Ethiopia has a special advantage in that more than 90% of its electricity comes from renewable sources, mainly hydro and solar. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Africa’s largest hydroelectric project, is expected to double its power generation, though the facility and has fueled a decade-long dispute over water supplies with downstream Egypt and Sudan.

“That scale of generation creates a foundation for electrified transport,” Parmar said. “It allows EVs to be powered by locally produced clean energy, rather than costly imports.”

“By gradually adopting EVs, that intensive fuel import expenditure can be reduced and redirected into other critical development needs,” Parmar said.

Globally, the International Energy Agency estimates electric vehicles displaced more than 1 million barrels of oil consumption per day in 2024.

Egypt, South Africa and Morocco also are pursuing a transition to EV use, adopting a mix of policy incentives, investing in manufacturing capacity and in clean energy.

“That transition is beginning to ease pressure on fuel demand,” said Bob Wesonga, policy and investments lead at the Africa E-Mobility Alliance.

“That’s over 100,000 vehicle owners who are no longer directly exposed to pump price shocks,” he said. “In the medium to long term, this creates a buffer against global oil volatility.”

For those who have switched, the savings are significant.

“A private EV owner now spends roughly $4 a month on charging compared to about $27 previously spent on fuel,” Wesonga said. “For public transport operators, the difference is even more striking.”

The transition to EVs faces some daunting structural hurdles, Parmar notes.

“The technology is already mature, the challenge is building it out fast enough,” he said.

Ethiopia is deploying ultra-fast charging hubs in its capital Addis Ababa, but scaling them nationwide will take time and investment.

“The biggest hurdle is the last-mile power distribution,” Wesonga said. “While Ethiopia has a surplus of generation, getting that power reliably to where it’s needed, especially outside Addis Ababa, remains a challenge.”

Frequent blackouts and delays in connecting high-capacity charging stations have slowed construction of needed infrastructure, even as demand for electric vehicles rises.

“Charging infrastructure is still heavily concentrated in the capital and along a few corridors,” Wesonga said. “That limits e-mobility to specific areas and creates a bottleneck as adoption grows.”

Ethiopia is one of several countries in Africa looking to build their own EV industries. Official data show 17 electric vehicle assembly plants are in the pipeline in Ethiopia, with plans to raise that number to 60 by 2030. It’s part of a broader strategy to localize production and reduce costs.

Affordability, however, remains a major constraint. While operating costs are lower, prices of electric vehicles remain high relative to average incomes.

“The purchase price is still out of reach for many,” Wesonga said. “At the same time, restrictions on fossil fuel vehicles have pushed up the cost of used cars, creating additional barriers.”

That dynamic could have unintended social impacts if not managed carefully.

“A national fleet transition is always gradual,” Parmar said. “Existing combustion vehicles will remain in use for some time, and the transition needs to account for livelihoods tied to that system.”

Even so, both experts say the long-term trajectory remains clear. Lower operating and maintenance costs for electric vehicles could reduce transport costs over time, easing the price of goods and improving access to economic opportunities.

Ethiopia is also looking to lessons from countries such as China and Norway, where policy support, infrastructure investment and consumer incentives have driven rapid adoption.

“This is not just about transport,” Wesonga said. “It’s about reshaping how the country uses energy, and who benefits from that shift.”

___

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The Unfinished Iran War: Are There Any Winners? 

Reports of explosions, US self-defense strikes, and renewed clashes near the Strait of Hormuz show how unresolved maritime leverage, Gulf vulnerability, and political deadlock could push the conflict into another round 

By Giorgia Valente / The Media Line 

New reports of explosions late Thursday and early Friday near Iran’s Bandar Abbas, Qeshm Island, and other parts of Hormozgan province put new pressure on a fragile US-Iran diplomatic track that had yet to produce even a temporary settlement. 

As of May 8, 2026, Washington and Tehran were reportedly still working toward a short-term memorandum rather than a full peace agreement, mediated by Pakistan, with Iran still reviewing the latest proposal. The framework under discussion would aim to halt the fighting, stabilize shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, and open a 30-day negotiation window, while leaving unresolved core disputes over Iran’s nuclear program, ballistic missile arsenal, proxy networks, and expanded control over maritime passage. 

What has emerged instead is a landscape of partial gains, exposed vulnerabilities, and shifting alignments. The United States demonstrated military reach but lost political confidence among allies and voters. Iran suffered serious blows but preserved the regime and key coercive tools. Israel restored parts of its deterrence but failed to translate battlefield achievements into a political endgame. Gulf states moved further apart, with the UAE and Saudi Arabia increasingly pursuing different models of power. Pakistan gained diplomatic relevance, while Qatar’s mediation role became less exclusive. China and Russia absorbed pressure but also gained diplomatic and strategic space in a more fractured international order. 

Gulf states sit at the core of the war’s main contradiction. They rely on US protection, but their ports, airspace, energy infrastructure, and commercial corridors become exposed whenever Washington escalates against Tehran. 

According to Iranian state and semiofficial media, explosion-like sounds were heard late Thursday and early Friday near Bandar Abbas, Qeshm Island, and other parts of Hormozgan province. Reuters reported that Iran’s Fars news agency said the origin and precise location of the sounds near Bandar Abbas were not immediately known. US Central Command later said US forces had intercepted Iranian missile, drone, and small-boat attacks on three US Navy destroyers transiting the Strait of Hormuz and carried out self-defense strikes on Iranian military facilities, including missile and drone launch sites, command-and-control locations, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance nodes. 

Iran accused the United States of violating the ceasefire by targeting Iranian vessels and coastal areas, while Iranian state media said Iranian forces exchanged fire with “enemy units” on Qeshm Island. CENTCOM said no US assets were struck. Iranian claims that US vessels suffered significant damage were not independently confirmed. Reports suggesting Emirati involvement in strikes inside Iran also remained unconfirmed. 

The renewed reports around Hormuz matter because they expose the central weakness of the emerging diplomatic track: It seeks to pause fighting without resolving Iran’s maritime leverage, Washington’s dependence on force, Israel’s lack of a political endgame, or the Gulf states’ vulnerability to retaliation. 

Those reports do not confirm a full return to the first phase of direct strikes and maritime confrontation. But they show that the conflict has already produced new armed exchanges before any political settlement has been consolidated. 

US: Military Reach Without Political Control 

Washington’s strongest card remains its capacity to shape the battlefield and global energy flows. The US and Israel eliminated key Iranian regime and military figures, while US airstrikes destroyed significant portions of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile production infrastructure. The crisis also forced China and other importers to reassess their energy exposure. But the broader American strategy produced uncertain results. Iran’s regime survived, its missile capabilities were damaged but not eliminated, and the fate of its enriched uranium stockpile remained unresolved. Its regional posture was weakened but not broken. Instead of producing a decisive diplomatic surrender, the war pushed Washington back into negotiations under pressure from Gulf allies, energy markets, and disrupted shipping. 

President Donald Trump’s handling of the conflict also came under growing domestic pressure. A Reuters/Ipsos poll published April 28 found President Trump’s approval at 34%, the lowest level of his current term, while only 34% of Americans approved of the US conflict with Iran. A Fox News Poll released five days earlier showed a somewhat higher level of support for the military campaign, at 45%, but still found a 55% majority opposed to US action in Iran. An NPR/PBS News/Marist Poll published May 6, based on interviews conducted April 27–30, found that 81% of Americans said current gas prices were placing either a major or minor strain on their household budgets, while 63% said President Trump deserved a great deal or a good amount of blame for the increase. The domestic backlash mattered because Iran did not need to defeat the United States militarily to affect Washington’s calculations. By threatening shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and adding pressure to global energy markets, Tehran could raise the political and economic cost of the war for the United States, Europe, and Gulf states. 

Project Freedom, the US-led operation to escort commercial shipping and reopen the Strait of Hormuz, became the clearest operational test of Washington’s position. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait reportedly halted or restricted American use of bases and airspace in their countries after the operation began. The restrictions were later eased, but the episode showed that Washington could no longer assume automatic Gulf alignment in a military escalation with Iran. 

New reports of explosions near Bandar Abbas, Qeshm Island, and other sites in Hormozgan province, Iranian claims of clashes with US naval forces, and confirmed US self-defense strikes on Iranian military facilities sharpened that perception. The UAE said three people were wounded after its air defenses engaged two Iranian ballistic missiles and three drones, though it was not immediately clear whether all were successfully intercepted. Commercial vessels belonging to third countries were also targeted or endangered. Reports circulated of attacks affecting US naval assets, although US Central Command denied some of those claims. 

Even without accepting every contested report, the strategic damage was clear: A US-led operation designed to reopen one of the world’s most important waterways had become another sign of how difficult it was for Washington to guarantee Gulf security without widening the war. 

Cyril Widdershoven, senior adviser at Blue Water Strategy and a geopolitical energy analyst, told The Media Line that the current US-Iran framework falls well short of a settlement. “In my eyes, not at all. It should be seen only as a pause mechanism. The reported framework would end hostilities, open a short negotiating window, ease restrictions on the Strait of Hormuz, address sanctions, and begin nuclear talks. Reality shows that this is not peace at all, but crisis management under pressure. All critical issues remain unresolved, including missile programs, proxy networks, IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps] influence, and regional competition. If these issues are not addressed and resolved, the agreement will serve only as a tactical reset rather than a strategic solution. The likelihood of a relapse into confrontation remains high.” 

Washington showed it could strike Iran, but it did not prevent Iran from imposing costs on Gulf infrastructure, shipping, energy markets, and allied territory. Widdershoven described the deal as both necessary and damaging for perceptions of US power. “For the Gulf, the current deal is all three. It is a compromise because nobody can afford permanent Hormuz paralysis. A necessity because the oil, LNG [liquefied natural gas], shipping, and insurance markets are cracking and will continue to do so. A failure because Iran may receive economic oxygen while core strategic capabilities remain intact. Washington now could be only buying time, as it stabilizes markets and avoids escalation. For most Gulf countries, the current US deal will make it seem as if there is no longer a basis to trust US deterrence and security.” 

At the level of NATO, the war amplified disagreements that had already emerged during the Ukraine conflict over military burden-sharing, strategic priorities, and energy vulnerability. Several European governments remained reluctant to become directly involved in a broader maritime confrontation in the Gulf, fearing another energy shock at a time when Europe was already dealing with economic stagnation, industrial pressure, and unresolved dependence on external suppliers. Roughly one-fifth of global petroleum consumption and a significant share of LNG exports transit through the Strait of Hormuz. Insurance premiums for shipping crossing the Gulf surged during the peak of the escalation, while energy traders and European policymakers discussed contingency plans in case of prolonged disruption. 

Rajat Ganguly, editor-in-chief of the Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs and a political analyst, told The Media Line that the war forms part of a broader weakening of Western cohesion. Offering a sharply critical view of US policy that remains contested in the European security debate, Ganguly linked the war to the fallout from Ukraine and the Nord Stream sabotage, for which no conclusive public finding has established US responsibility. “America used the Ukraine war to go after another peer competitor of America, which was Germany. Germany has been destroyed by the Ukraine war. Biden destroyed one of the Nord Stream pipelines, which used to bring very cheap Russian gas to Germany. It created energy security for Germany and through Germany to central Europe.” 

Ganguly argued that the Iran conflict deepened existing doubts about Washington’s alliance management. “Trump is probably going to destroy NATO. And then, as he said, the Greenland issue is not over yet. He might decide to confiscate Greenland. So that would be another thing that he can do.” 

For the United States, the war produced mixed results: greater pressure on Iran and China, but also deeper uncertainty among allies, voters, and Gulf partners. 

The Gulf: Protection Without Immunity 

Gulf states rely on US protection, but that protection does not make them immune to retaliation. Their ports, airspace, energy infrastructure, and commercial corridors become exposed whenever Washington escalates against Tehran. Iranian attacks toward the Emirates appeared to resume after the latest reported escalation, reinforcing the vulnerability that has run through the entire conflict. 

Widdershoven said the crisis exposed a basic Gulf dilemma. “The Gulf did not act as a single bloc. Some countries wanted a hard deterrence against Iran, while others feared escalation. Several Gulf states were much more concerned about the threat to trade, LNG credibility, ports, aviation, and investment confidence. The crisis exposed the old Gulf contradiction: everyone wants US protection, but nobody wants their economy turned into a battlefield.” 

The most visible rupture is between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Reports that the UAE would leave the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) effective May 1, 2026, weakened confidence in the broader OPEC+ alliance and deepened existing tensions with Saudi Arabia. But the split was not only about oil quotas. It reflected two competing models of Gulf power. 

Widdershoven said the Saudi-UAE split now reflects competing models of Gulf power. “The split is no longer only about oil quotas but, in reality, about two different state models. The Kingdom wants strategic centrality, price stability, and regional leadership. Abu Dhabi wants optionality, route control, access to technology, and freedom from cartel discipline. The UAE’s departure from OPEC has turned a quiet rivalry into a structural divergence.” 

He added, “The divergence is already evident across several domains, including ports, logistics, defense partnerships, and capital allocation. Saudi Arabia is still looking at internal capacity, while the UAE externalizes power through networks. The risk is that competition will increasingly spill into overlapping geographies such as the Red Sea and Horn of Africa.” 

That divergence was already visible in Sudan, Yemen, port politics, Red Sea strategy, and relations with Israel. Saudi Arabia still seeks regional centrality and leadership, but the UAE is building optionality: alternative corridors, Fujairah bypass capacity, non-OPEC flexibility, logistics networks, maritime infrastructure, Israeli defense technology, and deeper links across the Indian Ocean. 

Widdershoven said the UAE appears to have gained more than most regional actors, though the outcome remains messy. “At present, there are no clean winners. The UAE is the relative strategic winner because it has used the crisis to validate its long-standing bet on alternative corridors, Fujairah, ports, logistics, Israel-tech links, and non-OPEC flexibility. Iran is the tactical winner if it gains sanctions relief without dismantling core capabilities. Saudi Arabia is the uncomfortable loser: still central, but less able to command Gulf discipline. Qatar loses some diplomatic shine. Global markets remain exposed.” 

Closer UAE security cooperation with Israel fits this model, Widdershoven said. “The UAE is not simply reacting to war. It is building a post-Hormuz architecture that includes Israeli security technology, Indian Ocean trade depth, Fujairah bypass capacity, Red Sea/Horn links, and energy-logistics diversification. It is pragmatic, being too systematic to be temporary.” 

He continues, “All cooperation in place, cybersecurity, surveillance, missile defense, and maritime domain awareness point to institutionalization. Even if political optics fluctuate, the underlying infrastructure and intelligence links are likely to persist. It is no longer an ideology-based axis but one centered on technology and trade resilience.” 

Saudi Arabia, by contrast, appears more cautious. Riyadh pressured Washington over Project Freedom and resisted becoming a platform for escalation that could expose its territory, oil infrastructure, Red Sea routes, and Vision 2030 projects to Iranian or Houthi retaliation. This does not mean Saudi Arabia has moved toward Iran strategically. It means Riyadh wants deterrence without becoming the battlefield. 

Kuwait’s restrictions on US access similarly showed that smaller Gulf states are recalibrating. They want US protection, but not unlimited exposure to Iranian retaliation. For the Gulf, the outcome is protection without immunity. 

Iran: Damaged, Not Defeated 

Tehran appears to have lost commanders, infrastructure, and economic stability, but it retained the assets that mattered most for coercion: missiles, maritime leverage, domestic control, and diplomatic delay. 

The war damaged parts of the regime’s leadership and military infrastructure while exposing vulnerabilities inside the Islamic Republic. The closure and disruption of the Strait of Hormuz damaged Iran’s own economy as well as global shipping, insurance, and energy markets. The crisis also accelerated domestic repression, with rights groups describing continued executions, severe pressure on detainees and families, and internet restrictions that limited the ability of citizens and journalists to document events inside the country. 

At the same time, Tehran preserved major sources of leverage. It kept the regime in place. It retained significant missile capabilities despite strikes. Its enriched uranium stockpile remained unresolved. It maintained parts of its proxy architecture, even if weakened. It imposed costs on US allies in the Gulf. And it turned the Strait of Hormuz from a strategic chokepoint into a bargaining instrument and revenue mechanism. 

Iran’s creation of a Persian Gulf Strait Authority to vet and tax vessels seeking passage through Hormuz marked a significant change. Before the war, Tehran could threaten the Strait; during the crisis, it began institutionalizing control over maritime passage. This gave Iran both economic and diplomatic leverage. Even if the new system remains legally contested and operationally fragile, it showed that Iran used the crisis to claim a form of authority it did not previously exercise openly. 

Ganguly argued that even heavy bombing could not resolve the question of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile. “America and Israel underestimated that these 450 kilos of enriched uranium are so well hidden and so protected that even if you drop the biggest conventional bombs, the bunker busters, they would not be able to destroy that stockpile of uranium. Iran would retain it. The only way you could destroy it would be through a ground invasion. You would have to occupy the country and then try to get your hands on the material and destroy it.” 

He said US planners misunderstood the nature of the Iranian state. “America has no clue that Iran is a civilizational state. We are talking about Persian civilization, which goes back thousands of years. These people have endured a lot of hardship throughout their history. They are very proud people. They do not simply give up and surrender because bombs are falling on their heads.” 

The planning appeared to rely on a chain of assumptions that did not hold, Ganguly said. “On what basis did the US make this calculation that if they went and dropped bombs, the uranium stockpile would be destroyed, the regime would collapse, the people would rise up in revolt, and they would put Reza Pahlavi in power and be able to control Iran? And Russia and China would not intervene on Iran’s side? And the IRGC would just give up without fighting back? These are all American miscalculations.” 

Instead, Iran appears to have moved into a less centralized wartime structure, which Ganguly said had been anticipated in Tehran’s contingency planning. “There was always this perception in Iran that an attack like this would come. So, I think nobody was surprised that Ayatollah Khamenei, before he died, prepared a detailed plan of how Iran would react if its leaders were to be killed. And the IRGC was scattered into 31 or 32 autonomous commands all over the country. The mosaic model, as it is called, happened.” 

Internal resilience did not mean Iran emerged unscathed. Its economy suffered from the closure of Hormuz, and its own energy and export infrastructure faced pressure. But Tehran played its strongest cards effectively: the Strait, missiles, regional escalation, domestic coercion, and diplomatic delay. It also managed to frame itself in parts of the global media space as a state resisting US-Israeli aggression, even while tightening control at home. 

That coercive apparatus is central to understanding the regime’s survival. The absence of large-scale anti-regime uprisings did not necessarily reflect legitimacy; it also reflected fear, exhaustion, executions, and an information environment shaped by internet shutdowns and security pressure. Rights groups cited in the reporting said executions had continued during the crisis, and the war environment gave the regime more room to suppress dissent away from international scrutiny. 

Support from China, Russia, and North Korea is another contested but important part of the picture. Ganguly said Washington had expected Moscow and Beijing to protest diplomatically but avoid deeper involvement. “The other big miscalculation, if you ask me, was the reaction of Russia and China. I think America probably thought that Russia and China would protest diplomatically. They would condemn this, but they would not physically intervene in a strategic way. But we know now that they have. Russia has provided Iran with military hardware; so have the Chinese. And Iran has even got quite a lot of North Korean drones and other stuff made by North Korea. So North Korea, China, and Russia did provide military hardware to Iran.” 

For Iran, the outcome is severe damage without strategic surrender. 

China: Energy Risk and US Volatility 

Beijing has been facing real pressure from disruptions to Iranian and Venezuelan oil flows, especially where transactions bypass the dollar. The United States used the war and related sanctions to attack one of Beijing’s strategic vulnerabilities: energy security. China buys large volumes of discounted oil from Iran, Venezuela, and Russia, and some of those flows are structured outside traditional dollar-centered mechanisms. Disrupting them gives Washington a bargaining chip ahead of President Trump’s planned meeting with Xi Jinping next week. 

Ganguly frames this as part of the deeper contest between American hegemony and Chinese power. “One thing they have talked about is this paranoia, almost this fixation, that the US is locked in a hegemonic competition with China,” he said. “China’s Belt and Road Initiative, started under President Xi in 2013, has led China to become a major player in Latin America, in Venezuela, in the Middle East, and elsewhere.” 

He said Iran and Venezuela fit into that broader strategic picture because of their energy ties to Beijing. “Take Iran as an example: 90% of Iranian oil goes to China. The same story applies to Venezuela. Probably 80-90% of Venezuelan oil was bought by the Chinese,” Ganguly said. “So by attacking Venezuela and Iran, I think America’s game plan is to disrupt this oil supply to China, which would undoubtedly create economic pressure for China.” 

But Beijing also gained diplomatically. While Washington projected military power and coercive rhetoric, China increasingly projected itself as a stable and predictable actor focused on continuity of trade, long-term infrastructure, and controlled diplomacy. This contrast became especially visible in Europe and parts of the Gulf, where policymakers worried about the volatility of President Trump’s rhetoric, the possibility of sudden escalation, and uncertainty surrounding American commitments. 

Ganguly said the conflict also reflected deeper anxiety in Washington over changes in the global financial order, including the growing role of BRICS. The grouping originally included Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa and has since expanded. “The development of BRICS and the serious discussion taking place within BRICS about abandoning the American dollar as the currency of international trade has deeply unnerved the United States. The idea is that countries would no longer use the American dollar for trade, but instead use the Chinese yuan or other local currencies. Within BRICS, there are also countries supporting the creation of a common BRICS currency.” 

For China, the war brought energy pressure but also a diplomatic opportunity. 

Russia: Energy Relief and a Weaker NATO 

Moscow also benefited from the crisis in indirect but important ways. First, the war revived the attractiveness of discounted Russian energy. As Hormuz became unstable and Gulf energy flows more uncertain, buyers in Asia and elsewhere had stronger incentives to look again at Russian barrels, despite sanctions. Moscow did not need to defeat sanctions entirely; it needed the crisis to make its energy exports harder to ignore. 

Pressure also increased on Europe. After cutting much of its dependence on Russian energy following the Ukraine war, Western Europe now faced renewed concerns over high prices and disrupted oil and LNG supplies tied to the Hormuz crisis. That did not mean Europe was returning fully to Russian energy, but it strengthened Moscow’s argument that Western sanctions had left Europe more vulnerable. 

Ganguly said Russia’s position has been strengthened by expectations that failed to materialize. “If you think about the massive sanctions imposed on Russia, everybody expected Russia to collapse. That did not happen. In some ways, Russia surviving the sanctions can be seen as a victory. We kept hearing during the Ukraine conflict that the Russian military was demoralized and close to collapse. That did not happen.” 

The possibility of transferring Iranian enriched uranium to Russia remains contested and would require separate verification before being stated as fact. If Moscow becomes part of any future mechanism for storing, supervising, or transferring Iranian enriched uranium, Russia would move from being a spoiler or outside supporter to becoming a central node in nuclear diplomacy. That would give Moscow leverage not only over Tehran but also over Washington, Europe, and Israel. 

That pressure also brought Russia and China closer strategically. Both powers benefited from observing US and Israeli military operations, missile defense performance, Gulf vulnerabilities, and the behavior of American allies under pressure. Even if Moscow and Beijing do not form a formal alliance, the conflict reinforced a shared interest in weakening US dominance and accelerating alternatives to Western-controlled financial, military, and diplomatic systems. 

A weakened NATO is also strategically useful for Russia. If President Trump’s rhetoric, European hesitation, and transatlantic disputes continue to erode alliance cohesion, Moscow gains a less unified Western front. The same applies to energy vulnerability: The more Europe fears supply shocks and US unpredictability, the more Russia can present itself as an unavoidable strategic factor. 

For Russia, the war offered higher energy relevance, closer ties with Iran, and a less cohesive Western front. 

South Asia: Pakistan Rises, India Balances 

Islamabad is one of the clearest diplomatic beneficiaries of the crisis. Its role as mediator in the current US-Iran track gave Islamabad a level of diplomatic relevance it had not enjoyed in years. For Washington, Pakistan offered access, military credibility, proximity to Iran, and relationships with both Saudi Arabia and elements of the wider Muslim world. For Tehran, Pakistan was less politically branded than Qatar and less directly associated with Israeli or Gulf pressure. For Saudi Arabia, Pakistan remained a familiar security partner with Islamic legitimacy and military weight. 

Widdershoven said Pakistan became more useful because of the kind of leverage required in wartime diplomacy. “Diplomatic influence is currently focused on the transactional. Qatar is still relevant, but Pakistan has offered something different: military credibility, proximity to Iran, links to Washington, relations with Saudi Arabia, and a less politically branded mediation channel. In a high-volatility environment, the Pakistani option became much more acceptable. Pakistan’s involvement is a sign of a shift toward mediators who can combine diplomacy with implicit security leverage. In a wartime scenario, this is preferred.” 

Pakistan’s rise also affects India. New Delhi maintained its balancing posture throughout the crisis, preserving ties with Washington, Moscow, Israel, Iran, and the Gulf. Some Indian-linked shipping reportedly received selective passage or more flexible treatment during the Hormuz disruption, reflecting India’s tactical diplomacy and its importance to multiple sides. But Pakistan’s emergence as the central mediator was uncomfortable for India, given the historic rivalry between the two nuclear-armed neighbors. 

Ganguly said India’s balancing strategy gives it room to maneuver but also carries risks. “India is the classic fence sitter. It is not committing fully to one side or the other. Some might say this allows India to benefit from multiple relationships. India can be friends with Israel, buy Iranian oil, do business with the United States, and also buy cheap oil from Russia. But this strategy also has limits. There will come a point when India will not be able to continue doing this indefinitely.” 

Ganguly offered a speculative political reading of Pakistan’s sudden prominence, interpreting it partly through President Trump’s frustration with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. “Trump is not being able to get his way with Modi. And therefore, he is trying to teach Modi a lesson by saying, if you are going to play hardball with me, I will promote the Pakistanis.” 

The India-Pakistan angle goes beyond mediation. It shows how the Iran war has widened the diplomatic field beyond the traditional Gulf and US-Israel-Iran triangle. Pakistan gained relevance by being useful in a specific wartime context. India retained flexibility but saw its rival gain diplomatic visibility. 

Israel: Battlefield Gains Without a Day-After Plan 

Militarily, Israel gained. Politically, it remains stuck. Its deterrence improved after operations in Lebanon and Iran. The shekel strengthened against the dollar on hopes of a US-Iran ceasefire deal. Israel also reportedly deepened defense cooperation with the UAE, including reported transfers of laser, surveillance, and air defense-related technologies to help intercept Iranian missiles and drones. 

Yet Israel remains diplomatically isolated in key arenas. Gaza, Lebanon, and Tehran are all still open chapters. Hamas remains the dominant force in Gaza. Hezbollah has been severely degraded but not eliminated. Iran has been hit but not strategically neutralized. Israel’s military achievements have not translated into a clear political framework for the day after. 

Michael Milshtein, head of the Palestinian Forum at the Dayan Center in Tel Aviv, told The Media Line that Israel’s military achievements have not delivered the outcome promised by the government. 

“If you ask the prime minister or the government about this question, the answer will be ‘total victory’ and that ‘we are very close to total victory,’” Milshtein said. “But let us admit that almost three years after this ongoing war started, the three prominent arenas of this war remain open, and there is no total victory or total defeat of the enemies—not Hezbollah, not Iran, not the Palestinians, not Hamas.” 

He said many Israelis recognize the gap between Israel’s military accomplishments and its broader strategic position. 

“We are standing in front of an open front with no defeat of the enemies,” he said. “I think a broad part of the Israeli public understands that there have been dramatic military achievements and really impressive moves, but they also understand that there is no total victory.” 

According to Milshtein, Israel has not converted battlefield gains into a coherent postwar plan. “It is not enough only to achieve military victories. You also need to translate these achievements into strategy. Unfortunately, we became stuck in a situation where we could not really do that, mainly because of the leadership’s insistence on not speaking about the day after or about strategy.” 

Polling showed that the same tension was visible inside Israeli society. The Israel Democracy Institute found broad Jewish Israeli support for the campaign against Iran, including 93% support for Operation Roaring Lion in early March and continued majority support for pressing the war into late April. But other surveys pointed to growing doubts about the government’s ability to turn military pressure into a decisive result. A March survey by Reichman University’s Institute for Liberty and Responsibility found that while 65% of Israelis still supported the decision to go to war, only 37% expressed high confidence in the current leadership’s ability to manage the campaign, and respondents rated the IDF far higher than Netanyahu or the government. The polling captured the political tension Milshtein described: many Israelis backed confrontation with Iran, but confidence in the government’s broader management of the war was more fragile. 

Milshtein said Israeli expectations of regional alignment do not match Arab political realities. He argued that Israel’s belief in a common anti-Iranian front with Sunni Arab states does not erase the centrality of the Palestinian issue in Arab diplomacy. 

That issue remains central to Saudi calculations, he warned. “There is one very prominent condition of the Arab world regarding negotiations with the Palestinians. Until there are negotiations with the Palestinians, I do not see the Saudis mainly promoting normalization with Israel. Unfortunately, we still believe in this misconception that we can promote relations with the Arab world even if there are no negotiations with the Palestinians.” 

Israel has also become dangerously dependent on President Trump personally, Milshtein said. “Israel, like a gambler, decided to rely totally on Trump—not only on the American administration, but on Trump personally. The other problem is that many ideological figures leading this government, mainly from the religious Zionist camp, do not really think there is any importance to external, diplomatic, or international relations.” 

For Israel, the outcome is battlefield success without strategic closure. 

Qatar and Turkey: Smaller Openings in a Fragmented Order 

Doha remains important on issues such as Gaza and the Taliban, but the Iran war reduced the exclusivity of Qatar’s mediation role. Pakistan’s rise as a mediator showed that in high-risk wartime diplomacy, neutrality alone may not be enough. 

Widdershoven said Qatar’s role has narrowed in the new wartime environment. “Doha has clearly lost its monopoly on mediation. For issues such as Gaza and the Taliban, Qatar remains important. However, in the Gulf-Iran war environment, Pakistan is much more useful. Qatar’s perceived neutrality has now become its weakness. Geopolitical tensions have hardened, and neutrality alone may no longer suffice.” 

Turkey has remained more ambiguous. Ankara criticized Israeli military operations and attempted to position itself diplomatically between NATO, the Gulf, and the broader Muslim world, while also benefiting from the fragmentation of the regional order. Widdershoven said Ankara is also positioned to benefit. “Turkey will exploit diplomatic and defense openings.” 

Qatar remains useful where communication channels matter. Pakistan became useful where wartime diplomacy required proximity, military credibility, and Saudi ties. Turkey is trying to preserve room for maneuver across multiple blocs. 

The Next Round: Why the Pause May Not Hold 

Current diplomacy leaves two possibilities open: a temporary deal that reduces immediate pressure, or a relapse into confrontation if core issues remain unresolved. Iran has not yet formally accepted all US terms, while President Trump has publicly signaled optimism. The reported framework may halt fighting, ease restrictions on Hormuz, and reopen nuclear talks, but it does not resolve the structural drivers of the conflict. 

Fresh reports of explosions near Bandar Abbas, Qeshm Island, and other sites in Hormozgan province, confirmed US self-defense strikes on Iranian military facilities, renewed Iranian claims of naval clashes near the Strait, and the UAE’s report of another Iranian missile and drone attack suggest that the relapse scenario may already be taking shape before the diplomatic track has produced a durable result. 

Even if a temporary agreement is reached in the coming days, the consequences of the war are already reshaping not only the region but the international system itself. The UAE is redesigning trade and energy routes beyond Hormuz. Saudi Arabia is recalibrating its dependence on Washington while facing strategic competition from Abu Dhabi. Europe is reassessing its energy vulnerabilities and its dependence on American security guarantees. China is accelerating efforts to position itself as a stable and predictable alternative pole of power. Russia has regained influence through energy diplomacy and geopolitical positioning. Iran has institutionalized influence over maritime routes while surviving militarily and politically. Israel is adapting to the reality of a prolonged multifront confrontation rather than a decisive closure. 

Widdershoven said the emerging order is unlikely to resemble the old one. “This is not a peace settlement. It is a pressure valve. Nothing fundamental has changed on the ground yet. The Gulf is not returning to the old order. It is entering a fragmented system in which route control, storage, security technology, and diplomatic optionality are becoming the decisive variables.” 

Ganguly said any renewed fighting could broaden quickly. “Once the fighting resumes, there are always two lines of escalation. One is the horizontal escalation, meaning targets that had not been hit before will now be targeted, including desalination plants. Then comes the vertical escalation risk, where more and more lethal weapons begin to appear because the lesser weapons have failed to achieve the objective.” 

The diplomacy now being discussed may still reduce the immediate pressure. But the Strait of Hormuz was never only a battlefield; it was the test of whether force could create a political settlement. So far, it has shown the opposite. 

Hezbollah Drones Wound 4 IDF Soldiers, One Seriously  

By The Media Line Staff  

Four Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers were wounded Friday, including one seriously and three moderately, in separate attacks involving explosive drones launched by Hezbollah. The soldiers were evacuated for medical treatment, and their families were notified.  

In the latest incident, two soldiers sustained moderate wounds and one was seriously injured after a drone crossed from Lebanon into Israeli territory. The IDF Spokesperson’s Unit said that “this is another violation of the ceasefire understandings by the terrorist organization.”  

Earlier in the day, several Hezbollah explosive drones detonated near IDF troops operating in southern Lebanon. One soldier was moderately wounded in that attack and evacuated for medical treatment. His family was notified.  

Separately, police responded to an unmanned aerial vehicle discovered on the roof of a school in Nahariya. Officers and bomb disposal teams arrived at the scene, evacuated the school, and began efforts to neutralize and remove the drone. No injuries were reported.  

The IDF said Thursday that it was canceling several civilian events in northern Israel following an assessment that Hezbollah could launch rockets toward Israel in response to the killing of Ahmed Ghaleb Balout, commander of the group’s Radwan Force, in Beirut the previous day. 

By Ananda Teresia

JAKARTA, May 9 (Reuters) – Indonesian authorities resumed their search on Saturday for three hikers missing after Mount Dukono erupted on the Pacific island of Halmahera, a rescue official said.

At least 100 rescuers, military and police personnel, as well as two thermal drones, were deployed to find the two Singaporeans and one Indonesian, Iwan Ramdani, the head of the local rescue agency, told Reuters.

Survivors have told police that three people, including two Singaporeans, died in Friday’s eruption, local police chief Erlichson Pasaribu said, but the rescue agency had not confirmed the deaths by Saturday.

The volcano in North Maluku province began erupting on Friday morning, spewing ash as high as 10 km (6 miles) into the sky, Indonesia’s volcanology agency said.

“We are focusing the search around the crater, covering an area around 700 metres,” Iwan said. Authorities on Friday evacuated 17 people – seven Singaporeans and 10 Indonesians.

The rescue agency had halted the search on Friday evening as the volcano continued to erupt. Saturday’s search remained hampered, Iwan said, as the volcanology agency reported at least four morning eruptions.

Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and embassy in Jakarta were working with the Indonesian authorities to gather information and provide consular assistance and support to the affected Singaporeans and their families, the ministry said in a statement.

The volcanology agency is maintaining the third-highest alert level for Mount Dukono, said Lana Saria, the agency’s head, adding that residents and tourists were advised not to do any activities within 4 km (2.5 miles) of the crater.

There were no reports of flight disruptions caused by the eruption.

Indonesia sits on the Pacific “Ring of Fire”, an area of high seismic activity atop various tectonic plates.

(Reporting by Ananda Teresia in Jakarta and Xinghui Kok in Singapore; Editing by Kim Coghill and William Mallard)

‘They Trifled With Us’: President Trump Downplays Clash in Strait of Hormuz, Says Deal Could Happen ‘Any Day’  

By The Media Line Staff  

President Trump played down a military clash between US and Iranian forces in the Strait of Hormuz on Thursday and said a ceasefire agreement with Tehran could happen “any day,” despite renewed exchanges of fire that included US strikes and Iranian missile and drone launches.   

“Yeah, it is. They trifled with us today. We blew them away,” President Trump told reporters while touring construction at the Washington, DC, Reflecting Pool, characterizing the confrontation as a “trifle” and a “love tap.”   

President Trump also said a deal with Iran remained possible despite the escalation.   

“A deal with Iran might not happen, but it could happen any day. I believe they want the deal more than I do,’” he said.   

The US military reported that the destroyers USS Truxtun, USS Rafael Peralta, and USS Mason were attacked by Iranian drones, missiles, and fast-attack boats while transiting the Strait of Hormuz.   

US Central Command later confirmed what it described as “self-defense strikes” against Iranian military targets, including drone and missile launch sites. The US said Iranian boats involved in the confrontation were destroyed.   

Iranian state media reported that Iranian forces fired on what it described as “enemy units” and said the action came in retaliation for a US strike on an Iranian oil tanker.   

Explosions were reported near Iran’s Qeshm Island and Bandar Abbas following the exchange.   

The United Arab Emirates said its air defense systems were activated against incoming Iranian missiles and drones.   

“UAE air defenses are currently engaging missile and drone attacks originating from Iran,” the UAE defense ministry said on X, adding that interception sounds were heard “across various parts of the country.”   

According to a Fox News reporter, the US strikes on an Iranian port city and an island in the Strait of Hormuz followed anger from the UAE and Saudi Arabia over earlier Iranian attacks on the UAE that US officials had downplayed.   

The confrontation took place as negotiations continued over a possible ceasefire. The United Nations reported that around 1,500 ships remained trapped in the Gulf because of the ongoing Iranian blockade of the strait, while oil prices rose sharply amid the renewed hostilities.   

ISIS Disrupts Damascus Calm, Says It Assassinated Shiite Figure   

Rizik Alabi/The Media Line  

[Damascus] In a major security escalation that shook the Syrian capital and its outskirts, the Islamic State (ISIS) officially claimed responsibility for the assassination of prominent Shiite cleric Sheikh Farhan Hassan al-Mansour, preacher and imam of the Sayyidah Zaynab shrine.  

The attack, which took place on May 1, 2026, revived memories of the group’s past hit-and-run operations targeting carefully selected religious and military figures, demonstrating its ability to breach heavy security fortifications in one of Syria’s most sensitive areas.  

Last Friday morning, a powerful explosion echoed through the southern suburbs of Damascus. A correspondent for The Media Line in Damascus reported at the time that the blast targeted al-Mansour’s vehicle while he was traveling near the Safir Al-Zahra Hotel area surrounding the shrine.  

A Syrian security source who inspected the scene told The Media Line that an explosive device had been planted underneath the vehicle and detonated remotely, killing the cleric instantly and injuring several of his aides, as well as civilians who happened to be nearby.  

The Media Line’s Damascus correspondent said ISIS claimed responsibility for the bombing through its official channels and its weekly newsletter, Al-Naba. In a brief statement, the group described al-Mansour as one of the “imams of the Rafida”—a derogatory term used by extremists to refer to Shiites—claiming that the assassination was part of what it called an act of “revenge” and a continuing campaign targeting religious figures associated with the former Syrian regime and its allies.  

The choice of both the target and the location carries significant strategic symbolism. The Sayyidah Zaynab shrine is not only one of the most important religious sites for Shiites but also, for years, served as a political and military symbol of Iranian and Hezbollah influence in Syria before that presence diminished following the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.  

The ability to reach and assassinate the shrine’s leading cleric in the heart of his own stronghold sends a powerful message that ISIS sleeper cells still possess the capacity to monitor, maneuver and strike deep inside Damascus.  

Following the bombing, Syrian authorities imposed heightened security measures across Damascus and its countryside. Several Syrian bodies, including the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council, mourned al-Mansour, describing him as a “martyr of the pulpit” known for his moderate positions and calls for unity.  

Local media sources in Damascus later reported that authorities dismantled a three-member cell in the Sayyidah Zaynab area suspected of providing logistical support and facilitating the operation.  

The attack comes at a critical transitional moment for Syria, as ISIS appears to be exploiting vulnerabilities created by the redeployment of military forces and the preoccupation of security agencies with broader political challenges.  

Analysts say the group has shifted from its former strategy of territorial control—which effectively collapsed in 2019—to a campaign of “qualitative attrition” based on assassinations and ambushes aimed at undermining public confidence and exposing the state’s inability to protect key figures.  

The assassination of al-Mansour presents Syrian security agencies with a renewed challenge. While ISIS remnants remain largely hidden in pockets of the Syrian desert, the group has once again demonstrated that its operational reach can extend into vital urban centers, raising questions about the effectiveness of current counterterrorism strategies and the potential for sleeper cells to reshape the security landscape. 

TAIPEI, May 9 (Reuters) – Further delays to Taiwan military spending are a “concession” to China, the U.S. State Department said, as Taipei’s defence ministry detailed the impact of projects excluded from a package passed by the opposition-controlled parliament.

Taiwan President Lai Ching-te had sought $40 billion in supplementary defence spending to better deter China, which views the democratically governed island as its own territory and has stepped up its military pressure.

But after repeated delays by opposition parties, who hold the majority of seats, parliament on Friday approved only two-thirds of the money requested, all for U.S. weapons rather than including other projects like domestically developed drones and missiles. 

The opposition said that while it supports defence spending, it would not sign “blank cheques”, saying the proposals were vague in places and could open the door to corruption.

A State Department spokesperson said the U.S. supports Taiwan’s acquisition of critical defence capabilities “commensurate with the threat it faces” and consistent with the ongoing commitment of multiple U.S. administrations.

“While we are encouraged by the passage of this special defence budget after unhelpful stalling, the United States notes that further delays in funding the remaining proposed capabilities are a concession to the Chinese Communist Party,” the spokesperson added.

The U.S. is Taiwan’s most important international backer and arms supplier, despite the lack of formal diplomatic ties, and has strongly supported increased military spending. Beijing has repeatedly demanded an end to weapons sales.

In a statement late on Friday, Taiwan’s defence ministry said the approved spending completely excludes certain commercial purchases, which is highly likely to create “capability gaps”.

“Our country faces a severe and continuously escalating threat environment,” it said.

One plan not included is the Chiang Kung, or “Strong Bow”, anti-ballistic missile which is meant to form the backbone of Taiwan’s new “T-Dome” air defence system, the ministry added.

“Following its removal from the special budget, if it cannot be procured in a timely manner, air defence combat effectiveness will be severely impacted,” it said.

Lack of approval for drone systems like sea attack drones will significantly delay asymmetric warfare capabilities and affect projected economic growth and employment opportunities for domestic industry, the ministry said.

Lai said that while he appreciated the approved funding, which allows purchases of such items as the Lockheed Martin-made HIMARS multiple-launch rocket system to proceed, this was only the first step.

“Any gap will affect the integrity of the overall defence system. Any delay will increase the shared security risks borne by the people of Taiwan,” he posted on Facebook.

(Reporting by Ben Blanchard; Editing by William Mallard)

BUENOS AIRES, Argentina (AP) — Officials in Argentina’s Tierra del Fuego province are challenging the idea that the ongoing deadly hantavirus outbreak may have emerged there, pushing instead for investigations into the other Argentine provinces that passengers visited before boarding the ill-fated Atlantic cruise ship.

Current and former officials in the archipelago at the southernmost point of South America insist that the virus did not originate from the trash heap in Ushuaia that national health authorities named earlier this week as the most likely place two Dutch tourists contracted it while bird-watching.

“I believe we are facing a smear campaign against this destination,” Juan Facundo Petrina, the province’s director of epidemiology, told reporters Friday in a press conference from Ushuaia.

Federal officials didn’t contact local authorities initially — instead, they discovered the purported Ushuaia connection via media reports, he said. Additionally, Tierra del Fuego has never recorded a case of the hantavirus — let alone the Andes variant involved in the ship outbreak — unlike Argentine provinces further north.

The Dutch couple — both of whom died — spent just two days in Tierra del Fuego during their four-monthlong trip through Argentina and Chile, he added, which “dramatically reduces the likelihood that the infection happened here.”

As the main gateway to Antarctica, the remote town of Ushuaia drew over 157,000 cruise passengers last year — almost double its local population. Deep-pocketed cruisers have increasingly grown vital to Tierra del Fuego’s economy as its core electronic manufacturing sector reels from libertarian President Javier Milei’s slashing of trade barriers and subsidies.

“Now the whole world is associating Ushuaia, and cruise travel, with a lethal virus, and if this continues, reservations for next season are honestly going to plummet because nobody will want to be exposed,” said Rubén Rafael, the former health minister of Tierra del Fuego. “Ushuaia’s reputation as a tourist destination is suffering badly.”

When asked Friday whether the Argentine Health Ministry still favored the outbreak origin theory of the Ushuaia landfill, a ministry official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he wasn’t authorized to talk about the investigation, said that nothing had changed and that Ushuaia was the only place where the ministry was sending investigators, adding that it remained possible the virus originated elsewhere in Argentina.

The Health Ministry announced on Wednesday that it would dispatch experts from the state-backed Malbran Institute to trap rats at the Ushuaia trash heap and nearby areas and test them for the Andes strain of the hantavirus.

Over two days later, the investigators have yet to arrive. The official dismissed the delay as normal for Argentina’s slow-moving bureaucracy.

In Tierra del Fuego, Petrina said he hoped national investigators would clear Ushuaia’s name. He said it was taking a while “to determine all the exact locations where trapping and analysis will take place.”

Others in the left-leaning province complained that the government’s delay and lack of transparency came as part of a wider pattern ever since Milei took his chain saw to the country’s health system, withdrawing his country from the World Health Organization weeks after U.S. President Donald Trump did the same and defunding national programs responsible for tracking infectious diseases.

“The health system in Argentina is going through a serious crisis,” said Rafael, the former provincial health minister. “The system is weakened, and as a result, the response to this outbreak has been very slow. That exposes all of us.”

Outside Argentina, public health experts said that the investigation is a critical step so that a similar situation can be avoided.

“It’s not an extreme emergency, but it’s still of urgency in terms of collecting the data,” said Celine Gounder, an epidemiologist who serves as editor-at-large for public health at KFF Health News and previously advised the Biden administration on the coronavirus pandemic.

“If there is an Andes virus that is more infectious locally you’d want to know that so that you can warn local residents and take measures to prevent their infection. And if they haven’t started that process yet, that would be concerning.”

The Dutch couple that the WHO has identified as the first cruise passengers infected with the Andes variant — the only hantavirus that may be able to spread from person-to-person in rare cases — arrived in Argentina last November, according to the Argentine Health Ministry.

The couple, 70 and 69 years old, spent weeks driving up and down the country before making a series of border crossings between Argentina and Chile over months. They also traveled between Argentina and Uruguay in March before embarking on the Antarctic cruise from Ushuaia on April 1.

The governments of Chile, which has seen deadly outbreaks of the Andes variant before, and Uruguay, which hasn’t, declared the couple couldn’t have become infected while visiting based on the virus’ up-to-eight-week incubation period. They didn’t offer details.

Because the couple died, retracing their steps through the country is exceedingly difficult, said Argentine health officials, adding that they’re working to fill in some gaps in the couple’s travels.

Many independent Argentine epidemiologists believe that the hantavirus outbreak most likely emerged from the woodlands of central Patagonia, another major tourist destination where authorities have recently recorded hantavirus cases and long-tailed rats known to carry the Andes variant run rampant — unlike in Ushuaia.

“With the media pressure now, it wouldn’t surprise me if the government’s response has been more about quieting criticism by appearing to act,” said Raul González Ittig, genetics professor at the National University of Cordoba.