VÖLKLINGEN, Germany (AP) — Dozens of urban artists from 17 countries have converged on one of Europe’s most important industrial landmarks for a show that takes advantage of the former ironworks’ sprawling spaces and aura of abandonment.

At the Völklinger Hütte, or Völklingen Ironworks, the Urban Art Biennale 2026 is getting underway, continuing what has grown into a biennial tradition over the past decade and a half.

“This location is at the core of street art and graffiti art,” said Ralf Beil, the general director of the site, which is open to the public as a museum. “It all began in industrial places like this.”

Artists “love this place and they do works for the Völklinger Hütte, in the Völklinger Hütte, with the Völklinger Hütte,” he said.

This year’s show features 50 artists. They include France-based Tomas Lacque, whose installation features a small van, a pile of tires, toys and debris covered in a coat of paint. Standing in a hall where furnaces once worked, it appears to evoke fossil-fueled mobility being covered in ash like Pompeii.

Spanish artist Ampparito has painted the words “no hay nada de valor” (roughly, “There is nothing of value here”) in huge white letters on the roof of one of the site’s massive sheds — a work best seen from a viewing platform 45 meters (148 feet) above ground level.

Dutch artist Boris Tellegen, better known as Delta, contributed a massive green-and-black wooden sculpture that lights up the interior of the ironworks. French-based collective Vortex-X, who recycle salvaged material, stretched rays of white industrial fabric across one of the building’s halls in a work titled “Memory in transit.”

The ironworks spreads over a 6-hectare (nearly 15-acre) site, a maze of chimneys and furnaces in which visitors still encounter ominous industrial-era signs warning of risks such as a “danger of crushing.” They dominate the town of Völklingen, near Germany’s border with France.

They have been on UNESCO’s world heritage list since 1994, recognized as “the only intact example, in the whole of western Europe and North America, of an integrated ironworks that was built and equipped in the 19th and 20th centuries.”

The furnaces have been cold since 1986, when production ended, and the site has been preserved as it was then. But its appearance is much older, as no new installations were added after the mid-1930s.

“It’s so dusty and it’s so old, but it’s beautiful, you know, there’s beauty in decay,” said British artist Remi Rough. “I think what I’ve done makes you kind of just perceive it in a bit of a different way.”

Rough contributed small paintings that he said were meant to be “very clean and clinical,” in contrast to the site.

Danish artist Anders Reventlov said he felt “humble to be able to do something here.”

“As somebody told me … it was hell to work here,” he said. “Now it’s not hell. It’s like a nice place, people walking around, there are bees, there are beautiful flowers, but yeah, we still remember the history and that’s super important.”

Beil said that organizers “want pieces which are really original for this space and this also is then prohibiting (them) from being commercial.”

“This is an installation for the space,” he said. “This is pure art.”

The Biennale opens Saturday and runs until Nov. 15.

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Geir Moulson in Berlin contributed to this report.

VENICE, Italy (AP) — Geopolitical tensions spilled over into the Venice Biennale contemporary art exhibition, which opens its most chaotic and contested edition in memory Saturday with no Golden Lions after the jury quit in protest of Israel’s and Russia’s participation and loud protests outside their pavilions.

The jury limited its action to countries under investigation by the International Criminal Court for human rights abuses, but some say the U.S. should have been included. British artist Anish Kapoor cited “the politics of hate and war and all that that’s been going on now for too long.”

Visitors to the Giardini and Arsenale venues will vote for the best national pavilion, from 100 participants, and best participant in the main curated show, “In Minor Keys,” in Eurovision style. Winners will be announced closing day, Nov. 22.

Some places to start:

A towering red feathered sculpture with beaded embroidery greets visitors to the main curated show. Rooted in New Orleans Black Masking culture born from practices brought by enslaved Africans, the costume-like sculpture signals the show’s focus on minority perspectives.

The first African woman chosen to curate the main Biennale exhibition, the late Koyo Kouoh assembled 110 artists and artistic groups under a title meant to spotlight the overlooked, and five co-curators carried on her legacy after her death a year ago.

“She was someone who thought about making spaces for everyone to shine and we see it in her exhibition, we see it with ourselves,” said co-curator Marie Helene Pereira.

Lubaina Himid, a Turner Prize winner, explores what it is like to make a home in a new place in her exhibition titled “Predicting History: Testing Translation” for the British Pavilion, featuring brightly hued paintings of couples facing the dilemmas of newcomers.

In one, two architects are trying to decide where to build. “One of them is trying to decide, would we build a building here, that proves that we have contributed to the culture, and the other architect is saying ’No, no, no, no, no. Let’s build something that we can escape in tomorrow,” said Himid, who was born in Zanzibar and has spent more than 70 years in Great Britain.

The Vatican is offering spiritual respite from the world’s turmoil in the Mystic Gardens of Discalced Carmelite order next to Venice’s main train station.

Participants walk among the vineyards and pass a pomegranate tree and beds of herbs, wearing headphones that pick up music by the 12th-Century abbess, mystic and composer, St. Hildegard of Bingen, reinterpreted by artists such as Brian Eno and Patti Smith.

“Music also helps us delve into ourselves and understand, to use a phrase by Hildegard, the symphony that God has placed in our lives,” said Rev. Ermanno Barucco, prior of the Carmelite order.

A naked woman hangs from a bell outside the Austrian Pavilion, a human clapper making the performance art by Florentina Holzinger one of the hottest appointments in the Giardini. Inside, a nude rider swirls around on a Jet Ski inside a tank — emblematic of Venice’s relegation as an over-touristed amusement park.

A naked woman breathes through a scuba mouthpiece in another huge tank filled with water that has been flushed from nearby toilets and filtered multiple times. The presentation is called “Seaworld Venice.”

Inside Romanian-born artist Belu-Simion Fainaru’s installation, water drips from suspended tubes into a pool, stopping in cycles for just 42 seconds, representing divine creative power in Jewish mysticism. Locks hung around the pavilion, like those placed by lovers on bridges around Europe, are engraved with the commandment “Love thy neighbor as thyself,” in Hebrew, and the hopeful exhortation: “This too shall pass.”

“I am against boycott, I’m for dialogue, and that’s a political statement,” said Fainaru, who called the jury’s exclusion of Israel a form of discrimination.

Estonian artist Merike Estna will work throughout the Biennale on a huge wall painting inside a community center gymnasium that was once a church — the space’s layered history mirroring her practice of spilling paint to build deeply textured surfaces over time. The act of daily painting represents the undervalued quotidian work of women.

Curator Natalia Sielewicz likened it to “the everyday feminism of sustaining life, of sustaining our planet.”

DEIR AL-BALAH, The Gaza Strip (AP) — Despite the dire humanitarian crisis across the Gaza Strip, where a fragile ceasefire remains in place, a handful of Palestinian surfers are finding joy — and relief — riding the waves of the territory’s Mediterranean coastal waters.

Only three or four men still surf due to a shortage of surfboards and the materials needed to fix damaged ones, said Tahseen Abu Assi, a surfer in Gaza City.

Abu Assi carried his surfboard with him through every displacement he endured during the two-year war because, he said, he wouldn’t be able to replace it.

“If something happened to it I won’t be able to get another one,” he said, noting that no boards have entered the Palestinian territory since 2007. Surfboards are among sports equipment and other products that are banned by Israel.

On Tuesday, Abu Assi was among three surfers who took to the sea off the Gaza City port, including Khalil Abu Jiab, who road the high waves with his arms raised in joy.

After the war began, the Israeli military heavily restricted sea activity in Gaza, with the United Nations reporting that some fishermen were attacked onshore or at sea, including incidents involving fishermen using paddle boats.

Last year, Israel declared Gaza’s waters a “no-go zone,” banning fishing, swimming and sea access, making surfing risky.

Fishing and swimming are prohibited and dangerous in the waters off northern and southern Gaza. It’s also risky to enter the waters off central Gaza, where Gaza City is located, due to Israeli patrols.

“There is fear of course, but we can’t leave this sport,” Abu Assi said. “During the war, in the middle of the war, in the middle of the bombing and the planes above us, we used to go down and practice this sport.”

Gaza’s waves rarely rise high enough for surfing, so when they do, surfers drop everything to get in the water, he added.

Intense fighting across the enclave eased after a shaky ceasefire took effect on Oct. 10, but deadly Israeli strikes have continued, with both Hamas and Israel accusing each other of violating the truce.

Israel’s war with Hamas broke out on Oct. 7, 2023, after the militants attacked southern Israel, killing some 1,200 people, mostly civilians, and taking another 251 hostage. Israel’s military offensive in Gaza has killed 72,628 Palestinians and injured 172,520 others, according to the latest figures by Gaza’s Health Ministry.

Palestinians continue to struggle to secure food, clean water, medical care and shelter after the war caused widespread destruction, dismantled healthcare infrastructure and displaced most of the territory’s residents.

But for the territory’s few surfers, there is relief, even if only fleeting, when they take to the waves.

“As soon as the sea gets high, you leave your work and leave your whole life,” Abu Assi said. “Work can be caught up on, as they say. We go practice this sport.”

VATICAN CITY (AP) — The Vatican is sending new signals about how it intends to minister to LGBTQ+ Catholics in the Pope Leo XIV era, with signs of openness and limitations after Pope Francis ushered in a notable welcome during his 12-year pontificate.

Catholic LGBTQ+ advocates cheered this week when a Vatican working group released a report featuring the testimony of two gay, married Catholics who spoke openly about their sexuality, faith and how the Catholic Church’s negative teaching on homosexuality had hurt them.

Additionally, Leo made clear during a recent airborne news conference that he believed the church’s teachings on social justice, equality and freedom were far more important than its teaching on sexual morality, suggesting he doesn’t intend to prioritize the issue.

At that same news conference, though, Leo indicated he will go no further than Francis on the contentious matter of same-sex blessings. The Vatican has recently renewed its opposition to any local efforts to deviate from the Holy See stance.

For the Rev. James Martin, an American Jesuit who has spearheaded the church’s outreach to the LGBTQ+ community in the U.S., the developments signal strong continuity with Francis.

“If the Catholic Church has begun to listen to LGBTQ Catholics as part of its methodology, the church has already moved forward in a significant way,” he wrote recently.

But the signals have prompted criticism from conservatives, who have stressed official Catholic teaching — unchanged during even Francis’ pontificate — that says homosexual activity is “intrinsically disordered.”

The Vatican working group report summarized the work of experts studying controversial topics that emerged after Francis’ yearslong reform effort. The report has no binding value and is merely a synthesis of deliberations. It’s not clear what, if anything, Leo will do with it.

The testimony of the gay men, contained in annexes published on the Vatican’s synod website, featured moving accounts of how one, from Portugal, came to terms with his homosexuality and married his husband. The man also recounted how he sometimes struggled with his faith because of insensitive remarks from a Catholic spiritual director and forced “conversion therapy,” the scientifically discredited practice of using therapy to “convert” LGBTQ+ people to heterosexuality or traditional gender expectations.

The other testimony, from an American, criticized the therapy he went through and counseling he received from a Catholic pastoral group, Courage, that seeks to help people with same-sex attraction live chastely.

“My sexuality isn’t a perversion, disorder, or cross; it’s a gift from God,” the person wrote.

Courage, in a statement Friday, decried the negative depiction of its work, saying it has never been involved in “reparative therapy.”

“Courage has suffered calumny and detraction before, but usually from secular outlets,” the group said. “It is a great sadness and an additional wound to our members to have this false and unjust depiction in a Vatican document.”

Martin said the publication marked the first time that an official Vatican report “has included such detailed stories from LGBTQ Catholics. As such, it marks a significant step forward in the church’s relationship with the LGBTQ community.”

Bishop Joseph Strickland, whom Francis removed as bishop of Tyler, Texas, said the report was “deeply alarming” and contradicted church teaching about sexuality, sin, marriage and morality. In a post on his personal website entitled “An Emergency in the Church,” Strickland said the church’s teaching on homosexuality didn’t come from prejudice but from God.

“To suggest that the sin does not consist in the same-sex relationship itself is not merely confusing language. It is a direct assault upon Catholic moral doctrine and upon the words of Scripture itself,” he wrote.

The issue of LGBTQ+ outreach is coming to a head in Germany, where Catholic bishops have issued guidelines for priests on performing same-sex blessings that seemingly go beyond what Francis’ Vatican decreed in 2023.

That year, the Vatican’s doctrine office issued a declaration, known by its Latin title “Fiducia Supplicans,” that allowed priests to offer spontaneous, nonliturgical blessings to same-sex couples, provided such blessings aren’t confused with the rites and rituals of a wedding. Church teaching holds that marriage is a lifelong union between a man and woman.

The declaration prompted an unprecedented, continentwide dissent from African bishops and other conservatives, prompting the Vatican to clarify that such blessings must be brief, “10 or 15 seconds,” and aren’t a blessing of the union per se but the people in it.

In April 2025, German bishops and an influential lay organization published guidelines on implementing the declaration.

While stressing the spontaneous, nonliturgical nature of the blessing, the guidelines say they are for the relationship as opposed to individuals, and provide criteria for a proper celebration. The guidelines say, for example, there should be appropriate liturgical readings, “care in the preparation” of the event, and that people invited should offer “acclamation, prayer and song.”

Leo revealed last month, while traveling home from Africa, that the Vatican had told the Germans that it doesn’t agree with their proposals. This week, the 2024 letter in which the Holy See articulated its position was put online.

The letter, signed by doctrine chief Cardinal Victor Manuel Fernández, said the guidelines’ reference to acclamation resembled that of marriage and “in this sense effectively legitimizes the status of these couples, contrary to what is stated” in the Vatican’s 2023 declaration.

Fernández’s letter complained that the German guidelines’ mention of the location, aesthetic and music in a blessing suggested a liturgical ceremony that “contradicts” what the Vatican had allowed.

The letter didn’t veto the German guidelines outright but offered Fernández’s “observations.”

Leo met Thursday with German Cardinal Reinhard Marx, who — despite Fernández’s letter — recently recommended that priests in his archdiocese use the German guidelines as a basis for their pastoral care.

Cardinal Pietro Parolin said Wednesday that talk of sanctions against German priests who use the guidelines was “premature” and said dialogue with German bishops was ongoing.

The hope is “never to have to resort to sanctions, that problems can be resolved peacefully, as should be the case in the church,” Parolin said.

Martin said the Vatican had been clear that the Vatican’s 2023 declaration limited blessing of same-sex couples only under certain circumstances.

“But the synod has also made it clear that it is inviting the church to listen, in a new way, to the experiences of LGBTQ Catholics. So, to me, there is no contradiction,” he told The Associated Press. “Both ‘Fiducia’ and the synod report are steps forward in the church’s ministry to LGBTQ people.”

Francis DeBernardo, executive director of New Ways Ministry, which advocates for LGBTQ+ Catholics, praised Leo’s comments on church teaching about sexual morality.

Returning from Africa, Leo was asked about Marx’s adoption of the German guidelines and how he intended to preserve the unity of the church over the divisive issue of same-sex blessings.

“It is very important to understand that the unity or division of the Church should not revolve around sexual matters,” Leo said. “I believe there are much greater, more important issues, such as justice, equality, freedom of men and women, freedom of religion, that would all take priority before that particular issue.”

DeBernardo said it was “good to hear from the pope that he is making a decisive turn away from the church’s obsession with sexual matters.”

He also welcomed Leo’s “measured” comments about the German same-sex guidelines.

“He did not condemn or even criticize German church leaders. He simply said there is disagreement, and that this is not a cause for disunity,” DeBernardo said. “Both the new moral emphasis on social issues instead of sexuality, and the fostering of a more collegial church are good news for LGBTQ+ Catholics.”

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Geir Moulson contributed from Berlin.

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Associated Press religion coverage receives support through the AP’s collaboration with The Conversation US, with funding from Lilly Endowment Inc. The AP is solely responsible for this content.

MOSCOW (AP) — Security was tight in Moscow as President Vladimir Putin was set to speak on Saturday at a Red Square parade commemorating the defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II, even as a U.S.-brokered three-day ceasefire eased concerns about possible Ukrainian attempts to disrupt the festivities.

Putin, in power for more than a quarter-century, has used Victory Day, Russia’s most important secular holiday, to showcase the country’s military might and rally support for his military action in Ukraine, now in its fifth year. But this year, for the first time in nearly two decades, the parade will take place without tanks, missiles and other heavy weapons, aside from a traditional flyover of combat jets.

Officials said the sudden change of format was due to the “current operational situation” and pointed to the threat of Ukrainian attacks. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said the authorities have taken “additional security measures.”

Russia declared a unilateral ceasefire for Friday and Saturday, while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced a truce which was supposed to begin on May 6, but neither of them held as the parties traded blame for continuing attacks.

U.S. President Donald Trump announced Friday that Russia and Ukraine have bowed to his request for a ceasefire running Saturday through Monday and an exchange of prisoners, declaring that the break in fighting could be the “beginning of the end” of the war.

Zelenskyy, who said earlier this week that the Russian authorities “fear drones may buzz over Red Square” on May 9, followed up on Trump’s statement by issuing a decree mockingly permitting Russia to hold its Victory Day celebrations on Saturday, declaring Red Square temporarily off-limits for Ukrainian strikes.

Peskov, the Kremlin spokesman, shrugged off Zelenskyy’s decree as a “silly joke.” “We don’t need anyone’s permission to be proud of our Victory Day,” Peskov told reporters.

Russia’s bigger and better-equipped military has been making slow but steady gains along the more than 1,000-kilometer (over 600-mile) front line. Ukraine has hit back with increasingly efficient long-range attacks, striking Russian energy facilities, manufacturing plants and military depots. It has developed drones capable of reaching targets over 1,000 kilometers (more than 600 miles) deep into Russia, far beyond its capabilities before 2022.

Russian authorities warned that if Ukraine attempts to disrupt Saturday’s festivities, Russia will carry out a “massive missile strike on the center of Kyiv.” The Russian Defense Ministry warned the civilian population there and employees of foreign diplomatic missions of “the need to leave the city promptly.” The EU said its diplomats wouldn’t leave the Ukrainian capital despite Russian threats.

Putin has used Victory Day celebrations to encourage national pride and underline Russia’s position as a global power. The Soviet Union lost 27 million people in 1941-45 in what it calls the Great Patriotic War, an enormous sacrifice that left a deep scar in the national psyche and remains a rare point of consensus in the nation’s divisive history under Communist rule.

Victory Day parades on Red Square have involved a broad array of heavy weapons — from armored vehicles to nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles — every year since 2008. Smaller parades are held elsewhere across the country, but this time many of them have also been pared down or even canceled altogether for security reasons.

As the troops prepared to march across Red Square on Saturday, the authorities ordered restrictions on all mobile internet access and text messaging services in the Russian capital, citing the need to ensure public safety. The government has methodically tightened internet censorship and established increasingly stringent controls over online activities, causing rumblings and rare public expressions of discontent.

Malaysia’s King Sultan Ibrahim Iskandar, Laos President Thongloun Sisoulith, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Belarus’ authoritarian leader Alexander Lukashenko were set to attend the festivities in the Russian capital. Prime Minister Robert Fico of Slovakia, a European Union member, was to meet with Putin and lay flowers at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier memorial just outside the Kremlin walls but planned to stay away from the Red Square parade.

HONG KONG (AP) — Pro-democracy activist Jimmy Lai once hoped U.S. President Donald Trump could help stop the imposition of a controversial national security law. The law not only took effect but was also used to sentence him to 20 years in prison.

Ahead of an anticipated trip by Trump to Beijing to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping next week, Lai’s son said his family is now hoping that Trump can help secure his father’s release.

Lai, a prominent critic of Beijing, founded a pro-democracy newspaper that was shut down during a crackdown following the city’s massive anti-government protests in 2019.

Observers say the former media mogul’s plight symbolizes a decline in freedoms Beijing promised when the former British colony returned to Chinese rule in 1997. In an interview with The Associated Press, Sebastien Lai said he fears the clock is ticking for his 78-year-old father.

Trump is expected to discuss trade, the Iran war and Taiwan with Xi. But he said he is also planning to bring up Lai, telling conservative radio host Hugh Hewitt, “there’s a little bitterness, I would say, with him and Jimmy Lai.”

The younger Lai, 31, said his family is hopeful that Trump could help his father, adding that it’s easier to resolve than many of the other complex geopolitical issues the leaders will discuss.

He fears his father will die in prison, which would devastate the family and make him a martyr, he said.

“It’s a lose-lose scenario for every single person,” he said.

Trump has expressed sympathy for Jimmy Lai.

“I feel so badly,” he told reporters in December after Lai was found guilty of conspiracy to collude with foreign forces and conspiring with others to publish seditious articles. He had raised Lai’s case during his October meeting with Xi.

Mark Clifford, president of the Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong Foundation, which advocates for Lai’s release, said people briefed on the October meeting told him that Xi and his staff “noted” Trump’s remarks without pushing back aggressively. Clifford said that suggested they’re willing to talk.

Clifford added that Trump had instructed U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent to raise Lai’s release in last June’s trade talks with China, according to his source. Bessent again mentioned Trump’s desire to free Lai in a recent meeting with Chinese representatives, who acknowledged it without much comment, Clifford said, citing someone with direct knowledge.

“It is positive that senior Chinese officials have stopped pushing back on the issue,” he said. The Treasury Department did not respond to a request for comment.

In public, though, Beijing has remained tough on Lai. In March, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun called him the mastermind behind the riots that shook the city in 2019.

On Thursday, the spokesperson’s office of the ministry didn’t directly answer a question about whether China would consider releasing Lai, saying that Hong Kong issues are internal affairs and foreign interference is not allowed.

The Hong Kong government earlier said Lai’s case had nothing to do with press freedom. In a reply to the AP, it said Lai was convicted after an open and fair trial, and the government will ensure laws are observed and strictly enforced.

The White House did not respond to questions about how vigorously Trump would press for Lai’s release.

Over 100 U.S. lawmakers in a bipartisan group sent a letter to the White House Thursday urging Trump to seek Lai’s release at the upcoming summit with Xi.

Even as U.S.-China tensions have risen, diplomacy has managed to win the release of some prisoners. In 2024, U.S. pastor David Lin was freed after nearly 20 years in Chinese prison, and Washington and Beijing traded several other prisoners under a diplomatic agreement the same year.

But activists say Beijing is becoming less willing to release prisoners who have confronted it over human rights. The Chinese Nobel laureate Liu Xiaobo died at a hospital in northeast China in 2017 after foreign governments urged China to release him for cancer treatment abroad.

Human rights lawyer Jared Genser, who previously represented Liu, said a White House official told him that Trump had called Xi and urged Liu’s medical release.

Under Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, China was more focused on economic integration and more sensitive to its international reputation, said Genser, who helped win another activist’s freedom in 2007. Xi’s China emphasizes sovereignty and resisting foreign interference, he said.

“China knows that by taking a very tough and unrelenting position that most countries in the world are not going to be willing to do more than privately raise a case,” he said. “That self-censorship to me is the biggest factor … in our inability to secure the release of political prisoners under Xi Jinping, as compared to Hu Jintao.”

John Kamm, founder of the Dui Hua Foundation, which advocates for political prisoners, said China previously made concessions when it wanted something, like hosting the Olympics.

But he said U.S. inattention also made it harder to win the release of jailed activists.

“I don’t know of anyone in this administration,” he said, “who cares about political prisoners in China.” An exception might be Secretary of State Marco Rubio, he said, but Rubio’s focus is on other issues.

Kamm said Trump is prioritizing trade, investment and the Iran war. But he said China could agree to release Lai if the U.S. makes concessions on Beijing’s other priorities.

But Thomas Kellogg, executive director of Georgetown Center for Asian Law, said both Beijing and Washington have incentives to make a deal.

Releasing Lai would allow China to signal that it’s ready to move on after almost six years since Beijing imposed the security law in Hong Kong, while Trump’s administration could use a diplomatic win after “a difficult couple of months,” he said.

Kellogg said winning Lai’s release would help the administration earn praise even from its critics.

“If the Trump administration is pushing very hard for Jimmy Lai’s release, then we could get a positive outcome,” he said.

But Wilson Chan, co-founder of the think tank Pagoda Institute, believes the chance for a diplomatic solution is slim as Beijing has a message to send through Lai’s case.

Chan said if the international community keeps raising Lai’s case, Beijing may see him as an influential figure who still poses national security threats. But if they don’t, then Beijing won’t face pressure to act.

Lai, a British citizen, has decided not to appeal his conviction and sentence. The government, which insists Lai is Chinese, is seeking to confiscate his assets on national security grounds.

Sebastien Lai called the move another example of his father “still being attacked.”

The older Lai suffered from health issues including heart palpitations and diabetes, his Hong Kong legal team said in January. The prosecution said a medical report noted his general health condition remained stable. The government insists he was placed in solitary confinement at his own request.

The younger Lai, based in London, has maintained contact with his father through letters during the latter’s over five years in custody. He believes his father will want to live a quiet life if released early.

“My father will die in prison if he’s not freed,” he said. “The Chinese government would be complicit in killing him.”

HONG KONG (AP) — China’s exports rose 14.1% in April from a year earlier, the government said Saturday, despite the Iran war and lingering impacts from higher U.S. tariffs.

The data were released just days ahead of a planned meeting next week between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Beijing.

That beat analysts’ estimates and was a significant improvement from March’s 2.5% year-on-year expansion. Exports to the U.S. rose 11.3% from the year before, up from a 26.5% drop in March.

Imports climbed 25.3%, slower than the 27.8% growth in March but still robust.

The Trump-Xi summit comes at a time when relations are beset by multiple issues, with efforts to end the war in Iran eclipsing the usual sources of friction.

“We’re expecting that overall external demand will remain a solid driver of growth this year,” said Lynn Song, chief economist for Greater China at Dutch bank ING, likely led by China’s exports of semiconductors and autos.

In March, Chinese leaders set an annual economic growth target of 4.5% to 5%, slightly lower than last year’s 5% expansion and the lowest target since 1991. Export growth is expected to continue to power its wider economy, especially as shipments increased from China to Europe, Southeast Asia, Latin America and Africa over the past months.

China’s exports to the U.S. have fallen for most of the months since Trump imposed steeper tariffs and harsher controls on sharing of technology after he took office last year. But trade with the U.S. is likely improving this year, said Song, particularly because of the base effects of sharp declines caused by Trump’s tariff hikes in 2025.

Apart from efforts to broker a peace agreement to end the Iran war, trade and export controls, including rare earths and U.S. tech restrictions on China, will likely be on the agenda during the Trump-Xi summit, following a yearlong U.S.-China trade truce reached late last year when the two leaders last met in South Korea.

Major breakthroughs on export controls are unlikely, but the leaders’ upcoming meeting may bring “incremental” steps to troubleshoot trade friction, HSBC economists said in a recent research note.

“On balance, China looks to have more leverage,” wrote Leah Fahy, senior China economist of Capital Economics, in a note. “But higher tariffs haven’t stopped China’s exports from continuing to surge over the past year, and Beijing has showed that it is prepared to wait out U.S. pressure.”

For China, oil and fuel price hikes caused by the war in Iran are also feeding higher manufacturing and logistics costs across its many factories, said Wei Li, head of multi-asset investments at BNP Paribas Securities (China), while higher global inflation could dampen consumer purchasing power in China’s overseas markets.

Still, China’s overall economy has remained resilient compared with other countries, owing to its large oil reserves and more diversified energy sources.

ING’s Song said China’s trade surplus, which reached an all-time high of almost $1.2 trillion last year, could narrow for the whole of this year. Imports so far have been stronger in 2026, though China is still recovering from a prolonged property slump that has dragged on consumption and investment.

By Matt Spetalnick and Andrea Shalal

WASHINGTON, May 9 (Reuters) – With his decision to pull some U.S. troops from Germany, his threats to draw down forces elsewhere in Europe and his downplaying of Iran’s recent attacks on an important Gulf partner, President Donald Trump’s latest moves foreshadow what could be the war’s enduring legacy: the fraying of ties with key allies.

Even as the U.S. and Iran inch toward a potential off-ramp from their 10-week war, Trump’s words and deeds have revived fears among Washington’s long-standing friends – from Europe to the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific – that the United States might be unreliable in a future crisis.

In response, some traditional U.S. partners are starting to hedge their bets in ways that may bring long-lasting changes in relations with Washington, while adversaries such as China and Russia are looking to exploit strategic openings.

It is not yet clear whether Trump’s war with Iran will mark a permanent turning point in U.S. relations with the world.

But most analysts believe his erratic conduct since returning to office, essentially upending the rules-based global order, will further erode U.S. alliances, especially with NATO continuing to feel his ire for largely resisting his wartime demands.

“Trump’s recklessness with respect to Iran is resulting in some dramatic shifts,” said Brett Bruen, a former adviser in the Obama administration who now heads the Situation Room strategic consultancy. “U.S. credibility is at stake.”

Tensions are especially high between Trump and the Europeans since he joined Israel in striking Iran on February 28, claiming without evidence that Tehran was close to developing a nuclear weapon. Iran’s retaliatory closure of the Strait of Hormuz unleashed an unprecedented global energy shock that has made European countries some of the biggest economic losers from a war they never asked for.

Even before that, Trump had rattled allies by imposing sweeping tariffs, pushing to take over Greenland from Denmark and cutting military aid to Ukraine.

The rift widened when Trump announced this week he was withdrawing 5,000 of the 36,400 troops the U.S. has stationed in Germany after Chancellor Friedrich Merz angered him by saying publicly that the Iranians were humiliating the U.S. The Pentagon then scrapped a planned deployment of Tomahawk cruise missiles to Germany.

Trump – who has long questioned whether the U.S. should remain in the NATO alliance it helped create after World War Two – said he was also considering reducing U.S. forces in Italy and Spain, whose leaders have been at odds with him over the war.

FEUDING WITH ALLIES

The move followed Trump’s accusations that allies have not been doing enough to back the U.S. in the war and his suggestions that this meant Washington might no longer need to honor the alliance’s Article 5 mutual defense ​clause.

“President Trump has made his disappointment with NATO and other allies clear,” White House spokeswoman Anna Kelly said, noting that some requests to use military bases in Europe for the Iran war had been denied by host governments.

While insisting that Trump had “restored America’s standing on the world stage and strengthened relationships abroad,” she said he “will never allow the United States to be treated unfairly and taken advantage of by so-called ‘allies.’”

Trump had earlier taken aim at British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, deriding him in March as “not Winston Churchill” and threatening to impose a “big tariff” on imports from the UK.

And Trump’s Pentagon has floated the prospect of punishing NATO allies it believes have failed to support U.S. operations against Iran, including suspending Spain as a member and reviewing U.S. recognition of Britain’s claim to the Falkland Islands.

European governments have responded by stepping up efforts to increase cooperation among themselves, shoulder more of their own defense burden and jointly develop weapons systems to reduce reliance on the U.S., while trying to convince Trump of the value of maintaining transatlantic allies.

One European diplomat called Trump’s threats a clear signal for Europe to invest more in its own security but said leaders were resigned to having to roll with the punches for now.

As “middle powers,” the Europeans have limited options, especially given their dependence on their superpower ally for strategic deterrence against any possible attack from Russia, and analysts say the transition to greater self-reliance will take years.

In their efforts to mollify Trump, meanwhile, European officials have quietly stressed that many of their countries are allowing U.S. forces to use bases on their soil and their airspace during the Iran campaign.

But European leaders, some of whom had used flattery with Trump to defuse earlier crises, are also becoming wise to his negotiating tactics and more emboldened in standing up to him, analysts say.

Jeff Rathke, president of the American-German Institute at Johns Hopkins University, said that while Merz had seemed to charm Trump during earlier meetings, now he “is not trying to hide the critical assessment of what the United States has gotten itself into.”

But the Europeans are also mindful that Trump, barred by law from running again, could feel unrestrained “to do whatever he thinks” on the world stage before he leaves office in January 2029, the European diplomat said.

As some European leaders sound the alarm about NATO’s future, Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski told a conference in Warsaw there is no need to panic so long as Europe delivers on promised higher military spending, which Trump has long demanded.

Even so, the strains on U.S. alliances extend well beyond Europe.

When Iran this week launched missile and drone attacks against the United Arab Emirates, a close U.S. ally, Trump and his aides seemed to turn a blind eye, causing further unease among Gulf Arab states already hard hit by the war.

Trump was quick to dismiss a strike on Monday as minor, though it set fire to the important Fujairah oil port and prompted the government to close schools, and even after further attacks later in the week he insisted that a month-old ceasefire was still holding.

Trump went to war against the advice of some Gulf partners, and though they soon lined up in solidarity some now worry he could strike a deal that leaves them facing a still-dangerous neighbor.

The war has also stirred anxiety among Asian partners, many heavily dependent on oil that flowed freely through the strait before the conflict.

Countries like Japan and South Korea have already been unsettled by Trump’s high tariffs and disparagement of traditional alliances. Some may now wonder whether the vulnerability he has shown to economic pressure at home, including high gasoline prices, could mean Trump might hesitate when asked to help in a conflict with China, such as an invasion of Taiwan.

“What worries us most is that trust in, respect for, and expectations toward the United States – the core partner in the alliance Japan values most – have been shrinking,” Takeshi Iwaya, who served as Japan’s foreign minister at the start of Trump’s second term, told Reuters. “It could cast a long shadow over the entire region.”

Yasutoshi Nishimura, a former Japanese trade minister, said it has become increasingly important for Tokyo to respond to the shifting global power dynamic by forging closer ties with “like-minded middle powers” such as Britain, Canada, Australia and European nations.

Since the start of the war, Russia and China, long-time allies of Iran, have mostly steered clear, but analysts say they are watching closely.

Experts warn that Trump’s use of raw power in a war of choice against Iran, coming just weeks after a U.S. raid in Caracas that captured Venezuela’s president, could embolden China and Russia to intensify coercive moves against their neighbors.

Russia, a leading energy producer, has benefited from higher oil and natural gas prices driven up by the Iran war as well as the U.S. and Europe being distracted from the war in Ukraine.

Though the Iran crisis has crimped China’s energy supplies, Beijing may have learned lessons seeing the U.S. having to shift military assets from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East and how the world’s most powerful armed forces have at times been outmaneuvered by asymmetric tactics such as cheap drones, analysts say.

China has also seized the opportunity to try to promote itself as a more reliable global partner than the unpredictable Trump, who is due to visit Beijing next week.

But Victoria Coates, Trump’s deputy national security adviser in his first term, said Beijing would have a difficult time using the U.S. war against Iran as “carte blanche to run around the world saying that we’re a destabilizing force.”

“They haven’t exactly been a strong partner to their ally Iran throughout all this,” said Coates, now a vice president at the conservative Heritage Foundation think tank in Washington.

(Reporting by Matt Spetalnick and Andrea Shalal; Additional reporting by Yoshifumi Takemoto, Tim Kelly and John Geddie in Tokyo, Menna Alaa El Din in Dubai, Barbara Erling in Warsaw, Andrew Gray, Sabine Siebold and Lili Bayer in Brussels; Andrius Sytas in Vilnius and Luiza Ilie in Bucharest; Writing by Matt Spetalnick; Editing by Don Durfee and Daniel Wallis)

Nairobi, KENYA (AP) — Use of electric vehicles in Africa is surging, led by Ethiopia, as soaring prices and fuel shortages compel countries to opt for cleaner and cheaper transport.

Africa imported 44,358 electric vehicles from China in 2025, according to data from China’s Commerce Ministry, up from 19,386 in 2024. The shipments, valued at over $200 million, highlight growing demand, especially in Ethiopia after it banned new imports of gas and diesel-powered vehicles in 2024.

More than 115,000 EVs are now on Ethiopia’s roads, accounting for about 8% of the national fleet. In 2025, it imported a third of Africa’s imports from China, ahead of other major markets in South Africa, Egypt, Morocco and Nigeria.

As the Iran war drags on, Ethiopia’s fuel shortages are rippling through transport systems and daily life, reinforcing its effort to cut costly imports of oil and gas and strengthen its energy security. However that trend is raising questions about charging infrastructure and affordability.

Ethiopia’s spends about $4.2 billion on fuel imports annually, straining its foreign currency reserves.

Its minister of Trade and Regional Integration, Kassahun Gofe, said in a statement that the country also is spending up to $128 million monthly on fuel subsidies, while shipments fell short by more than 180,000 metric tons as the imports are disrupted by Iran’s effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the shipping route for about a fifth of oil from the Gulf region before the war.

The government has redoubled its campaign for quicker EV adoption, framing it as a critical buffer against external supply shocks.

“From a general perspective, it is sustainable,” said Hiten Parmar, executive director of South African- based The Electric Mission. “By replacing imported fuel with domestically generated electricity, Ethiopia is strengthening its energy security position.”

Ethiopia has a special advantage in that more than 90% of its electricity comes from renewable sources, mainly hydro and solar. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Africa’s largest hydroelectric project, is expected to double its power generation, though the facility and has fueled a decade-long dispute over water supplies with downstream Egypt and Sudan.

“That scale of generation creates a foundation for electrified transport,” Parmar said. “It allows EVs to be powered by locally produced clean energy, rather than costly imports.”

“By gradually adopting EVs, that intensive fuel import expenditure can be reduced and redirected into other critical development needs,” Parmar said.

Globally, the International Energy Agency estimates electric vehicles displaced more than 1 million barrels of oil consumption per day in 2024.

Egypt, South Africa and Morocco also are pursuing a transition to EV use, adopting a mix of policy incentives, investing in manufacturing capacity and in clean energy.

“That transition is beginning to ease pressure on fuel demand,” said Bob Wesonga, policy and investments lead at the Africa E-Mobility Alliance.

“That’s over 100,000 vehicle owners who are no longer directly exposed to pump price shocks,” he said. “In the medium to long term, this creates a buffer against global oil volatility.”

For those who have switched, the savings are significant.

“A private EV owner now spends roughly $4 a month on charging compared to about $27 previously spent on fuel,” Wesonga said. “For public transport operators, the difference is even more striking.”

The transition to EVs faces some daunting structural hurdles, Parmar notes.

“The technology is already mature, the challenge is building it out fast enough,” he said.

Ethiopia is deploying ultra-fast charging hubs in its capital Addis Ababa, but scaling them nationwide will take time and investment.

“The biggest hurdle is the last-mile power distribution,” Wesonga said. “While Ethiopia has a surplus of generation, getting that power reliably to where it’s needed, especially outside Addis Ababa, remains a challenge.”

Frequent blackouts and delays in connecting high-capacity charging stations have slowed construction of needed infrastructure, even as demand for electric vehicles rises.

“Charging infrastructure is still heavily concentrated in the capital and along a few corridors,” Wesonga said. “That limits e-mobility to specific areas and creates a bottleneck as adoption grows.”

Ethiopia is one of several countries in Africa looking to build their own EV industries. Official data show 17 electric vehicle assembly plants are in the pipeline in Ethiopia, with plans to raise that number to 60 by 2030. It’s part of a broader strategy to localize production and reduce costs.

Affordability, however, remains a major constraint. While operating costs are lower, prices of electric vehicles remain high relative to average incomes.

“The purchase price is still out of reach for many,” Wesonga said. “At the same time, restrictions on fossil fuel vehicles have pushed up the cost of used cars, creating additional barriers.”

That dynamic could have unintended social impacts if not managed carefully.

“A national fleet transition is always gradual,” Parmar said. “Existing combustion vehicles will remain in use for some time, and the transition needs to account for livelihoods tied to that system.”

Even so, both experts say the long-term trajectory remains clear. Lower operating and maintenance costs for electric vehicles could reduce transport costs over time, easing the price of goods and improving access to economic opportunities.

Ethiopia is also looking to lessons from countries such as China and Norway, where policy support, infrastructure investment and consumer incentives have driven rapid adoption.

“This is not just about transport,” Wesonga said. “It’s about reshaping how the country uses energy, and who benefits from that shift.”

___

The Associated Press’ climate and environmental coverage receives financial support from multiple private foundations. AP is solely responsible for all content. Find AP’s standards for working with philanthropies, a list of supporters and funded coverage areas at AP.org.

The Unfinished Iran War: Are There Any Winners? 

Reports of explosions, US self-defense strikes, and renewed clashes near the Strait of Hormuz show how unresolved maritime leverage, Gulf vulnerability, and political deadlock could push the conflict into another round 

By Giorgia Valente / The Media Line 

New reports of explosions late Thursday and early Friday near Iran’s Bandar Abbas, Qeshm Island, and other parts of Hormozgan province put new pressure on a fragile US-Iran diplomatic track that had yet to produce even a temporary settlement. 

As of May 8, 2026, Washington and Tehran were reportedly still working toward a short-term memorandum rather than a full peace agreement, mediated by Pakistan, with Iran still reviewing the latest proposal. The framework under discussion would aim to halt the fighting, stabilize shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, and open a 30-day negotiation window, while leaving unresolved core disputes over Iran’s nuclear program, ballistic missile arsenal, proxy networks, and expanded control over maritime passage. 

What has emerged instead is a landscape of partial gains, exposed vulnerabilities, and shifting alignments. The United States demonstrated military reach but lost political confidence among allies and voters. Iran suffered serious blows but preserved the regime and key coercive tools. Israel restored parts of its deterrence but failed to translate battlefield achievements into a political endgame. Gulf states moved further apart, with the UAE and Saudi Arabia increasingly pursuing different models of power. Pakistan gained diplomatic relevance, while Qatar’s mediation role became less exclusive. China and Russia absorbed pressure but also gained diplomatic and strategic space in a more fractured international order. 

Gulf states sit at the core of the war’s main contradiction. They rely on US protection, but their ports, airspace, energy infrastructure, and commercial corridors become exposed whenever Washington escalates against Tehran. 

According to Iranian state and semiofficial media, explosion-like sounds were heard late Thursday and early Friday near Bandar Abbas, Qeshm Island, and other parts of Hormozgan province. Reuters reported that Iran’s Fars news agency said the origin and precise location of the sounds near Bandar Abbas were not immediately known. US Central Command later said US forces had intercepted Iranian missile, drone, and small-boat attacks on three US Navy destroyers transiting the Strait of Hormuz and carried out self-defense strikes on Iranian military facilities, including missile and drone launch sites, command-and-control locations, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance nodes. 

Iran accused the United States of violating the ceasefire by targeting Iranian vessels and coastal areas, while Iranian state media said Iranian forces exchanged fire with “enemy units” on Qeshm Island. CENTCOM said no US assets were struck. Iranian claims that US vessels suffered significant damage were not independently confirmed. Reports suggesting Emirati involvement in strikes inside Iran also remained unconfirmed. 

The renewed reports around Hormuz matter because they expose the central weakness of the emerging diplomatic track: It seeks to pause fighting without resolving Iran’s maritime leverage, Washington’s dependence on force, Israel’s lack of a political endgame, or the Gulf states’ vulnerability to retaliation. 

Those reports do not confirm a full return to the first phase of direct strikes and maritime confrontation. But they show that the conflict has already produced new armed exchanges before any political settlement has been consolidated. 

US: Military Reach Without Political Control 

Washington’s strongest card remains its capacity to shape the battlefield and global energy flows. The US and Israel eliminated key Iranian regime and military figures, while US airstrikes destroyed significant portions of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile production infrastructure. The crisis also forced China and other importers to reassess their energy exposure. But the broader American strategy produced uncertain results. Iran’s regime survived, its missile capabilities were damaged but not eliminated, and the fate of its enriched uranium stockpile remained unresolved. Its regional posture was weakened but not broken. Instead of producing a decisive diplomatic surrender, the war pushed Washington back into negotiations under pressure from Gulf allies, energy markets, and disrupted shipping. 

President Donald Trump’s handling of the conflict also came under growing domestic pressure. A Reuters/Ipsos poll published April 28 found President Trump’s approval at 34%, the lowest level of his current term, while only 34% of Americans approved of the US conflict with Iran. A Fox News Poll released five days earlier showed a somewhat higher level of support for the military campaign, at 45%, but still found a 55% majority opposed to US action in Iran. An NPR/PBS News/Marist Poll published May 6, based on interviews conducted April 27–30, found that 81% of Americans said current gas prices were placing either a major or minor strain on their household budgets, while 63% said President Trump deserved a great deal or a good amount of blame for the increase. The domestic backlash mattered because Iran did not need to defeat the United States militarily to affect Washington’s calculations. By threatening shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and adding pressure to global energy markets, Tehran could raise the political and economic cost of the war for the United States, Europe, and Gulf states. 

Project Freedom, the US-led operation to escort commercial shipping and reopen the Strait of Hormuz, became the clearest operational test of Washington’s position. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait reportedly halted or restricted American use of bases and airspace in their countries after the operation began. The restrictions were later eased, but the episode showed that Washington could no longer assume automatic Gulf alignment in a military escalation with Iran. 

New reports of explosions near Bandar Abbas, Qeshm Island, and other sites in Hormozgan province, Iranian claims of clashes with US naval forces, and confirmed US self-defense strikes on Iranian military facilities sharpened that perception. The UAE said three people were wounded after its air defenses engaged two Iranian ballistic missiles and three drones, though it was not immediately clear whether all were successfully intercepted. Commercial vessels belonging to third countries were also targeted or endangered. Reports circulated of attacks affecting US naval assets, although US Central Command denied some of those claims. 

Even without accepting every contested report, the strategic damage was clear: A US-led operation designed to reopen one of the world’s most important waterways had become another sign of how difficult it was for Washington to guarantee Gulf security without widening the war. 

Cyril Widdershoven, senior adviser at Blue Water Strategy and a geopolitical energy analyst, told The Media Line that the current US-Iran framework falls well short of a settlement. “In my eyes, not at all. It should be seen only as a pause mechanism. The reported framework would end hostilities, open a short negotiating window, ease restrictions on the Strait of Hormuz, address sanctions, and begin nuclear talks. Reality shows that this is not peace at all, but crisis management under pressure. All critical issues remain unresolved, including missile programs, proxy networks, IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps] influence, and regional competition. If these issues are not addressed and resolved, the agreement will serve only as a tactical reset rather than a strategic solution. The likelihood of a relapse into confrontation remains high.” 

Washington showed it could strike Iran, but it did not prevent Iran from imposing costs on Gulf infrastructure, shipping, energy markets, and allied territory. Widdershoven described the deal as both necessary and damaging for perceptions of US power. “For the Gulf, the current deal is all three. It is a compromise because nobody can afford permanent Hormuz paralysis. A necessity because the oil, LNG [liquefied natural gas], shipping, and insurance markets are cracking and will continue to do so. A failure because Iran may receive economic oxygen while core strategic capabilities remain intact. Washington now could be only buying time, as it stabilizes markets and avoids escalation. For most Gulf countries, the current US deal will make it seem as if there is no longer a basis to trust US deterrence and security.” 

At the level of NATO, the war amplified disagreements that had already emerged during the Ukraine conflict over military burden-sharing, strategic priorities, and energy vulnerability. Several European governments remained reluctant to become directly involved in a broader maritime confrontation in the Gulf, fearing another energy shock at a time when Europe was already dealing with economic stagnation, industrial pressure, and unresolved dependence on external suppliers. Roughly one-fifth of global petroleum consumption and a significant share of LNG exports transit through the Strait of Hormuz. Insurance premiums for shipping crossing the Gulf surged during the peak of the escalation, while energy traders and European policymakers discussed contingency plans in case of prolonged disruption. 

Rajat Ganguly, editor-in-chief of the Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs and a political analyst, told The Media Line that the war forms part of a broader weakening of Western cohesion. Offering a sharply critical view of US policy that remains contested in the European security debate, Ganguly linked the war to the fallout from Ukraine and the Nord Stream sabotage, for which no conclusive public finding has established US responsibility. “America used the Ukraine war to go after another peer competitor of America, which was Germany. Germany has been destroyed by the Ukraine war. Biden destroyed one of the Nord Stream pipelines, which used to bring very cheap Russian gas to Germany. It created energy security for Germany and through Germany to central Europe.” 

Ganguly argued that the Iran conflict deepened existing doubts about Washington’s alliance management. “Trump is probably going to destroy NATO. And then, as he said, the Greenland issue is not over yet. He might decide to confiscate Greenland. So that would be another thing that he can do.” 

For the United States, the war produced mixed results: greater pressure on Iran and China, but also deeper uncertainty among allies, voters, and Gulf partners. 

The Gulf: Protection Without Immunity 

Gulf states rely on US protection, but that protection does not make them immune to retaliation. Their ports, airspace, energy infrastructure, and commercial corridors become exposed whenever Washington escalates against Tehran. Iranian attacks toward the Emirates appeared to resume after the latest reported escalation, reinforcing the vulnerability that has run through the entire conflict. 

Widdershoven said the crisis exposed a basic Gulf dilemma. “The Gulf did not act as a single bloc. Some countries wanted a hard deterrence against Iran, while others feared escalation. Several Gulf states were much more concerned about the threat to trade, LNG credibility, ports, aviation, and investment confidence. The crisis exposed the old Gulf contradiction: everyone wants US protection, but nobody wants their economy turned into a battlefield.” 

The most visible rupture is between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Reports that the UAE would leave the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) effective May 1, 2026, weakened confidence in the broader OPEC+ alliance and deepened existing tensions with Saudi Arabia. But the split was not only about oil quotas. It reflected two competing models of Gulf power. 

Widdershoven said the Saudi-UAE split now reflects competing models of Gulf power. “The split is no longer only about oil quotas but, in reality, about two different state models. The Kingdom wants strategic centrality, price stability, and regional leadership. Abu Dhabi wants optionality, route control, access to technology, and freedom from cartel discipline. The UAE’s departure from OPEC has turned a quiet rivalry into a structural divergence.” 

He added, “The divergence is already evident across several domains, including ports, logistics, defense partnerships, and capital allocation. Saudi Arabia is still looking at internal capacity, while the UAE externalizes power through networks. The risk is that competition will increasingly spill into overlapping geographies such as the Red Sea and Horn of Africa.” 

That divergence was already visible in Sudan, Yemen, port politics, Red Sea strategy, and relations with Israel. Saudi Arabia still seeks regional centrality and leadership, but the UAE is building optionality: alternative corridors, Fujairah bypass capacity, non-OPEC flexibility, logistics networks, maritime infrastructure, Israeli defense technology, and deeper links across the Indian Ocean. 

Widdershoven said the UAE appears to have gained more than most regional actors, though the outcome remains messy. “At present, there are no clean winners. The UAE is the relative strategic winner because it has used the crisis to validate its long-standing bet on alternative corridors, Fujairah, ports, logistics, Israel-tech links, and non-OPEC flexibility. Iran is the tactical winner if it gains sanctions relief without dismantling core capabilities. Saudi Arabia is the uncomfortable loser: still central, but less able to command Gulf discipline. Qatar loses some diplomatic shine. Global markets remain exposed.” 

Closer UAE security cooperation with Israel fits this model, Widdershoven said. “The UAE is not simply reacting to war. It is building a post-Hormuz architecture that includes Israeli security technology, Indian Ocean trade depth, Fujairah bypass capacity, Red Sea/Horn links, and energy-logistics diversification. It is pragmatic, being too systematic to be temporary.” 

He continues, “All cooperation in place, cybersecurity, surveillance, missile defense, and maritime domain awareness point to institutionalization. Even if political optics fluctuate, the underlying infrastructure and intelligence links are likely to persist. It is no longer an ideology-based axis but one centered on technology and trade resilience.” 

Saudi Arabia, by contrast, appears more cautious. Riyadh pressured Washington over Project Freedom and resisted becoming a platform for escalation that could expose its territory, oil infrastructure, Red Sea routes, and Vision 2030 projects to Iranian or Houthi retaliation. This does not mean Saudi Arabia has moved toward Iran strategically. It means Riyadh wants deterrence without becoming the battlefield. 

Kuwait’s restrictions on US access similarly showed that smaller Gulf states are recalibrating. They want US protection, but not unlimited exposure to Iranian retaliation. For the Gulf, the outcome is protection without immunity. 

Iran: Damaged, Not Defeated 

Tehran appears to have lost commanders, infrastructure, and economic stability, but it retained the assets that mattered most for coercion: missiles, maritime leverage, domestic control, and diplomatic delay. 

The war damaged parts of the regime’s leadership and military infrastructure while exposing vulnerabilities inside the Islamic Republic. The closure and disruption of the Strait of Hormuz damaged Iran’s own economy as well as global shipping, insurance, and energy markets. The crisis also accelerated domestic repression, with rights groups describing continued executions, severe pressure on detainees and families, and internet restrictions that limited the ability of citizens and journalists to document events inside the country. 

At the same time, Tehran preserved major sources of leverage. It kept the regime in place. It retained significant missile capabilities despite strikes. Its enriched uranium stockpile remained unresolved. It maintained parts of its proxy architecture, even if weakened. It imposed costs on US allies in the Gulf. And it turned the Strait of Hormuz from a strategic chokepoint into a bargaining instrument and revenue mechanism. 

Iran’s creation of a Persian Gulf Strait Authority to vet and tax vessels seeking passage through Hormuz marked a significant change. Before the war, Tehran could threaten the Strait; during the crisis, it began institutionalizing control over maritime passage. This gave Iran both economic and diplomatic leverage. Even if the new system remains legally contested and operationally fragile, it showed that Iran used the crisis to claim a form of authority it did not previously exercise openly. 

Ganguly argued that even heavy bombing could not resolve the question of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile. “America and Israel underestimated that these 450 kilos of enriched uranium are so well hidden and so protected that even if you drop the biggest conventional bombs, the bunker busters, they would not be able to destroy that stockpile of uranium. Iran would retain it. The only way you could destroy it would be through a ground invasion. You would have to occupy the country and then try to get your hands on the material and destroy it.” 

He said US planners misunderstood the nature of the Iranian state. “America has no clue that Iran is a civilizational state. We are talking about Persian civilization, which goes back thousands of years. These people have endured a lot of hardship throughout their history. They are very proud people. They do not simply give up and surrender because bombs are falling on their heads.” 

The planning appeared to rely on a chain of assumptions that did not hold, Ganguly said. “On what basis did the US make this calculation that if they went and dropped bombs, the uranium stockpile would be destroyed, the regime would collapse, the people would rise up in revolt, and they would put Reza Pahlavi in power and be able to control Iran? And Russia and China would not intervene on Iran’s side? And the IRGC would just give up without fighting back? These are all American miscalculations.” 

Instead, Iran appears to have moved into a less centralized wartime structure, which Ganguly said had been anticipated in Tehran’s contingency planning. “There was always this perception in Iran that an attack like this would come. So, I think nobody was surprised that Ayatollah Khamenei, before he died, prepared a detailed plan of how Iran would react if its leaders were to be killed. And the IRGC was scattered into 31 or 32 autonomous commands all over the country. The mosaic model, as it is called, happened.” 

Internal resilience did not mean Iran emerged unscathed. Its economy suffered from the closure of Hormuz, and its own energy and export infrastructure faced pressure. But Tehran played its strongest cards effectively: the Strait, missiles, regional escalation, domestic coercion, and diplomatic delay. It also managed to frame itself in parts of the global media space as a state resisting US-Israeli aggression, even while tightening control at home. 

That coercive apparatus is central to understanding the regime’s survival. The absence of large-scale anti-regime uprisings did not necessarily reflect legitimacy; it also reflected fear, exhaustion, executions, and an information environment shaped by internet shutdowns and security pressure. Rights groups cited in the reporting said executions had continued during the crisis, and the war environment gave the regime more room to suppress dissent away from international scrutiny. 

Support from China, Russia, and North Korea is another contested but important part of the picture. Ganguly said Washington had expected Moscow and Beijing to protest diplomatically but avoid deeper involvement. “The other big miscalculation, if you ask me, was the reaction of Russia and China. I think America probably thought that Russia and China would protest diplomatically. They would condemn this, but they would not physically intervene in a strategic way. But we know now that they have. Russia has provided Iran with military hardware; so have the Chinese. And Iran has even got quite a lot of North Korean drones and other stuff made by North Korea. So North Korea, China, and Russia did provide military hardware to Iran.” 

For Iran, the outcome is severe damage without strategic surrender. 

China: Energy Risk and US Volatility 

Beijing has been facing real pressure from disruptions to Iranian and Venezuelan oil flows, especially where transactions bypass the dollar. The United States used the war and related sanctions to attack one of Beijing’s strategic vulnerabilities: energy security. China buys large volumes of discounted oil from Iran, Venezuela, and Russia, and some of those flows are structured outside traditional dollar-centered mechanisms. Disrupting them gives Washington a bargaining chip ahead of President Trump’s planned meeting with Xi Jinping next week. 

Ganguly frames this as part of the deeper contest between American hegemony and Chinese power. “One thing they have talked about is this paranoia, almost this fixation, that the US is locked in a hegemonic competition with China,” he said. “China’s Belt and Road Initiative, started under President Xi in 2013, has led China to become a major player in Latin America, in Venezuela, in the Middle East, and elsewhere.” 

He said Iran and Venezuela fit into that broader strategic picture because of their energy ties to Beijing. “Take Iran as an example: 90% of Iranian oil goes to China. The same story applies to Venezuela. Probably 80-90% of Venezuelan oil was bought by the Chinese,” Ganguly said. “So by attacking Venezuela and Iran, I think America’s game plan is to disrupt this oil supply to China, which would undoubtedly create economic pressure for China.” 

But Beijing also gained diplomatically. While Washington projected military power and coercive rhetoric, China increasingly projected itself as a stable and predictable actor focused on continuity of trade, long-term infrastructure, and controlled diplomacy. This contrast became especially visible in Europe and parts of the Gulf, where policymakers worried about the volatility of President Trump’s rhetoric, the possibility of sudden escalation, and uncertainty surrounding American commitments. 

Ganguly said the conflict also reflected deeper anxiety in Washington over changes in the global financial order, including the growing role of BRICS. The grouping originally included Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa and has since expanded. “The development of BRICS and the serious discussion taking place within BRICS about abandoning the American dollar as the currency of international trade has deeply unnerved the United States. The idea is that countries would no longer use the American dollar for trade, but instead use the Chinese yuan or other local currencies. Within BRICS, there are also countries supporting the creation of a common BRICS currency.” 

For China, the war brought energy pressure but also a diplomatic opportunity. 

Russia: Energy Relief and a Weaker NATO 

Moscow also benefited from the crisis in indirect but important ways. First, the war revived the attractiveness of discounted Russian energy. As Hormuz became unstable and Gulf energy flows more uncertain, buyers in Asia and elsewhere had stronger incentives to look again at Russian barrels, despite sanctions. Moscow did not need to defeat sanctions entirely; it needed the crisis to make its energy exports harder to ignore. 

Pressure also increased on Europe. After cutting much of its dependence on Russian energy following the Ukraine war, Western Europe now faced renewed concerns over high prices and disrupted oil and LNG supplies tied to the Hormuz crisis. That did not mean Europe was returning fully to Russian energy, but it strengthened Moscow’s argument that Western sanctions had left Europe more vulnerable. 

Ganguly said Russia’s position has been strengthened by expectations that failed to materialize. “If you think about the massive sanctions imposed on Russia, everybody expected Russia to collapse. That did not happen. In some ways, Russia surviving the sanctions can be seen as a victory. We kept hearing during the Ukraine conflict that the Russian military was demoralized and close to collapse. That did not happen.” 

The possibility of transferring Iranian enriched uranium to Russia remains contested and would require separate verification before being stated as fact. If Moscow becomes part of any future mechanism for storing, supervising, or transferring Iranian enriched uranium, Russia would move from being a spoiler or outside supporter to becoming a central node in nuclear diplomacy. That would give Moscow leverage not only over Tehran but also over Washington, Europe, and Israel. 

That pressure also brought Russia and China closer strategically. Both powers benefited from observing US and Israeli military operations, missile defense performance, Gulf vulnerabilities, and the behavior of American allies under pressure. Even if Moscow and Beijing do not form a formal alliance, the conflict reinforced a shared interest in weakening US dominance and accelerating alternatives to Western-controlled financial, military, and diplomatic systems. 

A weakened NATO is also strategically useful for Russia. If President Trump’s rhetoric, European hesitation, and transatlantic disputes continue to erode alliance cohesion, Moscow gains a less unified Western front. The same applies to energy vulnerability: The more Europe fears supply shocks and US unpredictability, the more Russia can present itself as an unavoidable strategic factor. 

For Russia, the war offered higher energy relevance, closer ties with Iran, and a less cohesive Western front. 

South Asia: Pakistan Rises, India Balances 

Islamabad is one of the clearest diplomatic beneficiaries of the crisis. Its role as mediator in the current US-Iran track gave Islamabad a level of diplomatic relevance it had not enjoyed in years. For Washington, Pakistan offered access, military credibility, proximity to Iran, and relationships with both Saudi Arabia and elements of the wider Muslim world. For Tehran, Pakistan was less politically branded than Qatar and less directly associated with Israeli or Gulf pressure. For Saudi Arabia, Pakistan remained a familiar security partner with Islamic legitimacy and military weight. 

Widdershoven said Pakistan became more useful because of the kind of leverage required in wartime diplomacy. “Diplomatic influence is currently focused on the transactional. Qatar is still relevant, but Pakistan has offered something different: military credibility, proximity to Iran, links to Washington, relations with Saudi Arabia, and a less politically branded mediation channel. In a high-volatility environment, the Pakistani option became much more acceptable. Pakistan’s involvement is a sign of a shift toward mediators who can combine diplomacy with implicit security leverage. In a wartime scenario, this is preferred.” 

Pakistan’s rise also affects India. New Delhi maintained its balancing posture throughout the crisis, preserving ties with Washington, Moscow, Israel, Iran, and the Gulf. Some Indian-linked shipping reportedly received selective passage or more flexible treatment during the Hormuz disruption, reflecting India’s tactical diplomacy and its importance to multiple sides. But Pakistan’s emergence as the central mediator was uncomfortable for India, given the historic rivalry between the two nuclear-armed neighbors. 

Ganguly said India’s balancing strategy gives it room to maneuver but also carries risks. “India is the classic fence sitter. It is not committing fully to one side or the other. Some might say this allows India to benefit from multiple relationships. India can be friends with Israel, buy Iranian oil, do business with the United States, and also buy cheap oil from Russia. But this strategy also has limits. There will come a point when India will not be able to continue doing this indefinitely.” 

Ganguly offered a speculative political reading of Pakistan’s sudden prominence, interpreting it partly through President Trump’s frustration with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. “Trump is not being able to get his way with Modi. And therefore, he is trying to teach Modi a lesson by saying, if you are going to play hardball with me, I will promote the Pakistanis.” 

The India-Pakistan angle goes beyond mediation. It shows how the Iran war has widened the diplomatic field beyond the traditional Gulf and US-Israel-Iran triangle. Pakistan gained relevance by being useful in a specific wartime context. India retained flexibility but saw its rival gain diplomatic visibility. 

Israel: Battlefield Gains Without a Day-After Plan 

Militarily, Israel gained. Politically, it remains stuck. Its deterrence improved after operations in Lebanon and Iran. The shekel strengthened against the dollar on hopes of a US-Iran ceasefire deal. Israel also reportedly deepened defense cooperation with the UAE, including reported transfers of laser, surveillance, and air defense-related technologies to help intercept Iranian missiles and drones. 

Yet Israel remains diplomatically isolated in key arenas. Gaza, Lebanon, and Tehran are all still open chapters. Hamas remains the dominant force in Gaza. Hezbollah has been severely degraded but not eliminated. Iran has been hit but not strategically neutralized. Israel’s military achievements have not translated into a clear political framework for the day after. 

Michael Milshtein, head of the Palestinian Forum at the Dayan Center in Tel Aviv, told The Media Line that Israel’s military achievements have not delivered the outcome promised by the government. 

“If you ask the prime minister or the government about this question, the answer will be ‘total victory’ and that ‘we are very close to total victory,’” Milshtein said. “But let us admit that almost three years after this ongoing war started, the three prominent arenas of this war remain open, and there is no total victory or total defeat of the enemies—not Hezbollah, not Iran, not the Palestinians, not Hamas.” 

He said many Israelis recognize the gap between Israel’s military accomplishments and its broader strategic position. 

“We are standing in front of an open front with no defeat of the enemies,” he said. “I think a broad part of the Israeli public understands that there have been dramatic military achievements and really impressive moves, but they also understand that there is no total victory.” 

According to Milshtein, Israel has not converted battlefield gains into a coherent postwar plan. “It is not enough only to achieve military victories. You also need to translate these achievements into strategy. Unfortunately, we became stuck in a situation where we could not really do that, mainly because of the leadership’s insistence on not speaking about the day after or about strategy.” 

Polling showed that the same tension was visible inside Israeli society. The Israel Democracy Institute found broad Jewish Israeli support for the campaign against Iran, including 93% support for Operation Roaring Lion in early March and continued majority support for pressing the war into late April. But other surveys pointed to growing doubts about the government’s ability to turn military pressure into a decisive result. A March survey by Reichman University’s Institute for Liberty and Responsibility found that while 65% of Israelis still supported the decision to go to war, only 37% expressed high confidence in the current leadership’s ability to manage the campaign, and respondents rated the IDF far higher than Netanyahu or the government. The polling captured the political tension Milshtein described: many Israelis backed confrontation with Iran, but confidence in the government’s broader management of the war was more fragile. 

Milshtein said Israeli expectations of regional alignment do not match Arab political realities. He argued that Israel’s belief in a common anti-Iranian front with Sunni Arab states does not erase the centrality of the Palestinian issue in Arab diplomacy. 

That issue remains central to Saudi calculations, he warned. “There is one very prominent condition of the Arab world regarding negotiations with the Palestinians. Until there are negotiations with the Palestinians, I do not see the Saudis mainly promoting normalization with Israel. Unfortunately, we still believe in this misconception that we can promote relations with the Arab world even if there are no negotiations with the Palestinians.” 

Israel has also become dangerously dependent on President Trump personally, Milshtein said. “Israel, like a gambler, decided to rely totally on Trump—not only on the American administration, but on Trump personally. The other problem is that many ideological figures leading this government, mainly from the religious Zionist camp, do not really think there is any importance to external, diplomatic, or international relations.” 

For Israel, the outcome is battlefield success without strategic closure. 

Qatar and Turkey: Smaller Openings in a Fragmented Order 

Doha remains important on issues such as Gaza and the Taliban, but the Iran war reduced the exclusivity of Qatar’s mediation role. Pakistan’s rise as a mediator showed that in high-risk wartime diplomacy, neutrality alone may not be enough. 

Widdershoven said Qatar’s role has narrowed in the new wartime environment. “Doha has clearly lost its monopoly on mediation. For issues such as Gaza and the Taliban, Qatar remains important. However, in the Gulf-Iran war environment, Pakistan is much more useful. Qatar’s perceived neutrality has now become its weakness. Geopolitical tensions have hardened, and neutrality alone may no longer suffice.” 

Turkey has remained more ambiguous. Ankara criticized Israeli military operations and attempted to position itself diplomatically between NATO, the Gulf, and the broader Muslim world, while also benefiting from the fragmentation of the regional order. Widdershoven said Ankara is also positioned to benefit. “Turkey will exploit diplomatic and defense openings.” 

Qatar remains useful where communication channels matter. Pakistan became useful where wartime diplomacy required proximity, military credibility, and Saudi ties. Turkey is trying to preserve room for maneuver across multiple blocs. 

The Next Round: Why the Pause May Not Hold 

Current diplomacy leaves two possibilities open: a temporary deal that reduces immediate pressure, or a relapse into confrontation if core issues remain unresolved. Iran has not yet formally accepted all US terms, while President Trump has publicly signaled optimism. The reported framework may halt fighting, ease restrictions on Hormuz, and reopen nuclear talks, but it does not resolve the structural drivers of the conflict. 

Fresh reports of explosions near Bandar Abbas, Qeshm Island, and other sites in Hormozgan province, confirmed US self-defense strikes on Iranian military facilities, renewed Iranian claims of naval clashes near the Strait, and the UAE’s report of another Iranian missile and drone attack suggest that the relapse scenario may already be taking shape before the diplomatic track has produced a durable result. 

Even if a temporary agreement is reached in the coming days, the consequences of the war are already reshaping not only the region but the international system itself. The UAE is redesigning trade and energy routes beyond Hormuz. Saudi Arabia is recalibrating its dependence on Washington while facing strategic competition from Abu Dhabi. Europe is reassessing its energy vulnerabilities and its dependence on American security guarantees. China is accelerating efforts to position itself as a stable and predictable alternative pole of power. Russia has regained influence through energy diplomacy and geopolitical positioning. Iran has institutionalized influence over maritime routes while surviving militarily and politically. Israel is adapting to the reality of a prolonged multifront confrontation rather than a decisive closure. 

Widdershoven said the emerging order is unlikely to resemble the old one. “This is not a peace settlement. It is a pressure valve. Nothing fundamental has changed on the ground yet. The Gulf is not returning to the old order. It is entering a fragmented system in which route control, storage, security technology, and diplomatic optionality are becoming the decisive variables.” 

Ganguly said any renewed fighting could broaden quickly. “Once the fighting resumes, there are always two lines of escalation. One is the horizontal escalation, meaning targets that had not been hit before will now be targeted, including desalination plants. Then comes the vertical escalation risk, where more and more lethal weapons begin to appear because the lesser weapons have failed to achieve the objective.” 

The diplomacy now being discussed may still reduce the immediate pressure. But the Strait of Hormuz was never only a battlefield; it was the test of whether force could create a political settlement. So far, it has shown the opposite.